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ACTIVE SYMBOLS 
CLAUDIA E. HAUPT∗ 
Abstract: Visual representations of religious symbols continue to puzzle judges. 
Lacking empirical data on how images communicate, courts routinely dismiss 
visual religious symbols as “passive.” This Article challenges the notion that 
symbols are passive, introducing insights from cognitive neuroscience research 
to Establishment Clause theory and doctrine. It argues that visual symbolic mes-
sages can be at least as active as textual messages. Therefore, religious messages 
should be assessed in a medium-neutral manner in terms of their communicative 
impact, that is, irrespective of their textual or visual form. Providing a new con-
ceptual framework for assessing religious symbolic messages, this Article recon-
ceptualizes coercion and endorsement—the dominant competing approaches to 
symbolic messages in Establishment Clause theory—as matters of degree on a 
spectrum of communicative impact. This focus on communicative impact recon-
ciles the approaches to symbolic speech in the Free Speech and Establishment 
Clause contexts and allows Establishment Clause theory to more accurately ac-
count for underlying normative concerns. 
INTRODUCTION 
It’s no help to the cause of constitutional interpretation that religion is an 
emotional subject and that there is no systematic evidence of the social, po-
litical, psychological, cultural, ethical, or indeed religious consequences of 
the display of religious symbols in today’s United States. Here as elsewhere 
evidence-based law remains a dream. 
—Judge Richard Posner1 
Consider two public school graduation ceremonies. During the first cere-
mony, held at the school, an invited member of the clergy steps onto the stage 
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 1 Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist. (Elmbrook II), 687 F.3d 840, 873 (7th Cir. 2012) (en 
banc) (Posner, J., dissenting). 
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and offers an invocation and benediction—both are nonsectarian.2 The second 
graduation ceremony is held not in the school building but rather “in the main 
sanctuary of . . . a local Christian evangelical and non-denominational” church 
where “[a]n enormous Latin cross, fixed to the wall, hangs over the dais and 
dominates the proceedings.”3 But none of the participants engage in prayer or 
make any reference to the cross, other religious symbols present in the church, 
or religion generally. 
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the first scenario was unconstitutional 
as a violation of the Establishment Clause in Lee v. Weisman.4 The second sce-
nario, conversely, was initially upheld by a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit—the first federal appellate court to rule on 
the constitutionality of the practice of holding public school graduation cere-
monies in houses of worship—against an Establishment Clause challenge.5 
The Seventh Circuit later reversed en banc, but over strong dissents from judg-
es Ripple, Easterbrook, and Posner.6 
Do religious symbols communicate messages differently than religious 
words in prayer or scripture? Courts have repeatedly dismissed visual repre-
sentations of religious symbols as merely “passive,” crafting a distinction be-
tween the visual and the textual that significantly underestimates the commu-
nicative power of the former. This suggests that courts deem visual religious 
displays less powerful, and therefore, less constitutionally suspect than textual 
religious messages. Are religious visual symbols more benign than prayer be-
cause they are merely “passive”? This question—fundamentally important 
both for Establishment Clause theory and doctrine—remains underexplored in 
the literature. 
This Article argues that characterizing religious symbols as passive is de-
scriptively inaccurate, doctrinally incoherent, and analytically unsound. Never-
theless, this remains a common approach in the courts. As an empirical matter, 
judges erroneously ascribe a passive quality to visual displays; this is largely 
based on incorrect assumptions about how visual images communicate.7 Courts 
                                                                                                                           
 2 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 581–84 (1992). 
 3 Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist. (Elmbrook I), 658 F.3d 710, 712–13, 715 (7th Cir. 
2011), rev’d en banc, 687 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 4 Lee, 505 U.S. at 586. 
 5 See Elmbrook I, 658 F.3d at 712. 
 6 Elmbrook II, 687 F.3d at 843; id. at 861 (Ripple, J., dissenting); id. at 869 (Easterbrook, C.J., 
dissenting); id. at 872 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
 7 See infra notes 138–238 and accompanying text. Assessing the difference between the textual 
and the visual is not just an Establishment Clause concern. See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Com-
pelled Disclosures, 65 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 2), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=2258742, archived at http://perma.cc/7DD7-TAE9 (discussing “the new trend of com-
pelled visual speech” and its First Amendment implications). Beyond the First Amendment, the role 
of the visual recently has received attention in areas such as evidence, copyright, and trademark law. 
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tend to assume a lower intensity of communicative impact when religious sym-
bols are at issue than when spoken or written religious words are at issue, mani-
festing a hierarchical binary: text is presumed active and privileged over images 
which are merely passive.8 In doing so, this Article argues, the courts have it 
exactly backwards. 
In contrast to the Establishment Clause context, courts have made incipi-
ent efforts in the speech context to evaluate the distinctions between the textual 
and the visual.9 The notion that certain visual expressions are “passive” is chal-
lenged in the speech cases, putting into stark contrast the recognized power of 
images in these cases with the “passive” designation in cases involving visual 
religious symbols. To moderate that disconnect, this Article makes the case for 
more symmetry within the First Amendment as it concerns empirical claims 
regarding the perception of visual symbols. 
The novelty of the approach to visual symbols presented in this Article lies 
in the insight that by neglecting the difference between the textual and the visual, 
Establishment Clause theory and doctrine overlook a distinction that is important 
for assessing the communicative impact of the message. Unlike other approaches 
that prefer to textualize the symbols or do not explicitly distinguish between the 
visual and the textual,10 this Article argues that the inquiry best starts with the 
visual image. First, as an empirical matter, how do images—and, by extension, 
visual representations of religious symbols—communicate? Second, as a matter 
                                                                                                                           
See, e.g., NEAL FEIGENSON & CHRISTINA SPIESEL, LAW ON DISPLAY: THE DIGITAL TRANSFOR-
MATION OF LEGAL PERSUASION AND JUDGMENT 104 (2009) (discussing the role of visuals in evi-
dence law); Laura A. Heymann, The Law of Reputation and the Interest of the Audience, 52 B.C. L. 
REV. 1341, 1385–86 (2011) (discussing the purposes of visual symbols in the context of trademark 
law); Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of 
Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 841 (2009) (discussing the effects of “competing 
factual perceptions” in evidence law); Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of 
Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683, 687 (2012) (discussing images in the context of copyright law). 
 8 See generally JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, trans., 
The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, rev. ed. 1998) (1967) (discussing the historical hierarchical binaries 
that dominate Western thought, including that between the active and the passive). Scholars have 
observed this phenomenon in other speech contexts as well. See, e.g., Corbin, supra note 7, at 24–25 
(discussing compelled speech and the reason/emotion binary). 
 9 See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2750–51 (2011) (Alito, J., concur-
ring in the judgment) (discussing the difference between written materials and violent video games); 
id. at 2768–69 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (distinguishing video games from more passive forms of me-
dia); see also R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1211–13 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (discuss-
ing textual and visual warning statements on cigarette packages). 
 10 See, e.g., B. Jessie Hill, Putting Religious Symbolism in Context: A Linguistic Critique of the 
Endorsement Test, 104 MICH. L. REV. 491, 493 (2005) (textualizing visual images); Frank S. Ravitch, 
Religious Objects as Legal Subjects, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1011, 1016 (2005) (initially focusing 
on the religious objects and symbols); Mark Strasser, Passive Observers, Passive Displays, and the 
Establishment Clause, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1123, 1130–34 (2010) (not explicitly distinguish-
ing between the visual and the textual). 
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of cultural interpretation, what do symbols mean? This second step of the analy-
sis draws from the existing literature on the interpretation of religious symbols.11 
Although some have observed that courts fail to appreciate the power of sym-
bols, placing them at “the bottom of the speech hierarchy,”12 the visual nature of 
religious symbols remains underexamined. Scholars have occasionally criticized 
the characterization of religious symbols as “passive.”13 But what is noticeably 
absent from the literature critical of the “passive” characterization is an empirical 
assessment of whether it is descriptively accurate; this Article concludes that it is 
not. 
That religious symbolic images are powerful is not a new insight; the bouts 
of iconoclasm during the Protestant Reformation in the sixteenth century, for 
instance, suggest as much. But engaging the power of images and the power of 
words equally in what this Article calls a “medium-neutral approach” is neces-
sary to strike the correct normative balance in Establishment Clause theory. 
This Article proceeds from the normative premise that the State may not 
adopt a religious identity; it may neither determine its own religious preference 
nor communicate such a preference to its citizens.14 The underlying concern is 
to avoid harm resulting from excluding groups of citizens from fully engaging 
in democratic participation, an interest grounded in political theory considera-
tions. All citizens, regardless of religious affiliation or lack thereof, will rely on 
the state’s responsiveness to their concerns. In the free speech context, Robert 
Post articulated the value of participatory democracy as allowing citizens to 
“experience the value of self-government.”15 Similar considerations obtain 
with respect to nonestablishment: “[e]very group must be able to compete for 
political influence and participate in determining a society’s identity and goals 
and the means to achieve them.”16 This is particularly important in a democrat-
ic society with increasing religious pluralism, both among religious groups and 
                                                                                                                           
 11 See infra notes 239–299 and accompanying text. 
 12 Timothy Zick, Cross Burning, Cockfighting, and Symbolic Meaning: Toward a First Amend-
ment Ethnography, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2261, 2394 (2004). 
 13 See, e.g., Ravitch, supra note 10, at 1016 (asserting that “there is no such thing as a ‘passive’ 
religious object or symbol”); Strasser, supra note 10, at 1124 (criticizing the lack of clarity in judicial 
uses of the term). 
 14 See Charles Taylor, The Meaning of Secularism, HEDGEHOG REV., Fall 2010, at 23, 23 (stating 
that “no religious outlook or (religious or areligious) Weltanschauung can enjoy a privileged status, let 
alone be adopted as the official view of the state”). 
 15 Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 483 (2011). The 
objective of participation under this theory is “making government responsive to their views.” Id. at 
484. Each citizen must equally have the opportunity to participate; indeed, this equal opportunity is 
deemed “vital to the legitimacy of the entire legal system.” James Weinstein, Participatory Democra-
cy as the Central Value of American Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 498 (2011). 
 16 Claudia E. Haupt, Transnational Nonestablishment, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 991, 1061 (2012). 
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between religion and nonreligion. When the State assumes its own religious 
identity, it jeopardizes this fundamental value. 
This Article proceeds in a descriptive, an empirical-analytic, and a pre-
scriptive part. Part I explicates the two dominant approaches to Establishment 
Clause questions involving symbolic communicative acts—coercion and en-
dorsement.17 The prevailing current theory conceives of coercion and en-
dorsement as different in kind. This Part then explains how the notion of “pas-
sive” symbols maps onto these two central theories. It demonstrates that the 
passive quality courts ascribe to religious symbols operates in a constitutional-
ly relevant manner. But the notion that visual religious symbols are passive—
in contrast to textual religious messages—is based on a misconception about 
the communicative power of images. Judicial assessments of visual religious 
symbols are missing important empirical information about how visual images 
communicate. Yet, empirical evidence is readily available. 
Part II imports cognitive neuroscience literature18—both as primary 
source material and as applied to other areas of the law (in what is sometimes 
described as the emerging field of “neurolaw”19)—into Establishment Clause 
theory.20 As this Part explains, empirical evidence from the field of cognitive 
neuroscience teaches us that the human brain processes words and images dif-
ferently. Images are processed at higher rates than textual components and they 
are more directly linked to emotion than text.21 Visual symbolic messages 
                                                                                                                           
 17 See infra notes 24–137 and accompanying text. 
 18 Cognitive neuroscience emerged in the 1990s as a result of combining psychology with the 
functional analysis of the brain made possible by technological advances in brain imaging. See Oliver 
R. Goodenough & Micaela Tucker, Law and Cognitive Neuroscience, 6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 61, 
63–65 (2010). 
 19 Neurolaw is the combined study of law and neuroscience. Id. at 63–65 (providing a brief over-
view of the development of neurolaw). Insights from neuroscience are increasingly playing a role in 
the legal field, both in case law and legal academic literature. See, e.g., Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. 
Ct. at 2768 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing neuroscience data); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 
(2010) (discussing “brain science”); Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy, Through a Scanner Darkly: 
Functional Neuroimaging as Evidence of a Criminal Defendant’s Past Mental States, 62 STAN. L. 
REV. 1119, 1134–35 (2010); Nita A. Farahany, Incriminating Thoughts, 64 STAN. L. REV. 351, 366–
68 (2012); Amanda C. Pustilnik, Pain as Fact and Heuristic: How Pain Neuroimaging Illuminates 
Moral Dimensions of Law, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 801, 815–16 (2012); Erez Reuveni, Copyright, Neu-
roscience, and Creativity, 64 ALA. L. REV. 735, 738 (2013); Frederick Schauer, Can Bad Science Be 
Good Evidence? Neuroscience, Lie Detection, and Beyond, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1191, 1203–04 
(2010); Lois A. Weithorn, Developmental Neuroscience, Children’s Relationships with Primary 
Caregivers, and Child Protection Policy Reform, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1487, 1537–41 (2012); 
Dominique J. Church, Note, Neuroscience in the Courtroom: An International Concern, 53 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1825, 1831–40 (2012). See generally NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW: BRAIN, MIND, 
AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE (Brent Garland ed., 2004) (providing a report and commissioned papers 
discussing the relationship between neuroscience and the law); Kevin Davis, Brain Trials, A.B.A. J., 
Nov. 2012, at 37, 42 (providing a perspective on neuroscience in the courtroom). 
 20 See infra notes 151–187 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 151–187 and accompanying text. 
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therefore can be at least as active as textual symbolic messages. Further, this 
Part analyzes how these characteristics of visual images implicate constitution-
al analysis in the speech context. There, several Supreme Court opinions dis-
play a—largely intuitive—assessment of the visual and textual that indicates a 
higher sensitivity to the communicative power of images than in the Estab-
lishment Clause context. Finally, this Part distinguishes the empirical claim—
how images communicate—from the cultural interpretation of what symbols 
mean. 
Part III explains what these insights mean as a prescriptive matter for Es-
tablishment Clause theory and, more broadly, First Amendment approaches to 
visual symbols.22 It makes three discrete contributions to First Amendment 
theory, both in the Free Speech and the Establishment Clause context. First, the 
theoretical and doctrinal approach to religious symbols ought to be reassessed 
in light of the empirical evidence on how images communicate. The character-
ization of religious symbols as “passive” is inaccurate, so at a minimum, the 
prescriptive lesson is to abandon it and treat visual representations of religious 
symbols the same as spoken or written religious texts. Second, contributing to 
greater symmetry within the First Amendment, this Part moves to reconcile the 
treatment of visual symbolic messages in Free Speech and Establishment 
Clause theory by shifting the focus to communicative impact. Third, having 
abandoned the active/passive distinction, the evaluation of religious symbolic 
messages—like that of textual messages—ought to be conceptualized accord-
ing to their communicative impact, irrespective of the medium by which they 
are conveyed. This Part provides a novel conceptual framework for doing so. 
Within the communicative impact framework, in which endorsement and coer-
cion are reconceptualized as matters of degree rather than kind, the medium-
neutral focus on communicative impact allows us to more accurately account 
for the underlying theoretical concerns of the Establishment Clause. The foun-
dational normative concern is that the State may not take on its own religious 
identity, and therefore may also not communicate its own religious preference. 
For such a communicative act expressing the state’s religious identity or pref-
erence, the medium used to convey the message is secondary to its communi-
cative impact. 
                                                                                                                           
 22 See infra notes 300–364 and accompanying text. 
2014] Active Symbols 827 
I. FROM WORDS TO IMAGES 
Although law traditionally has been mostly concerned with texts,23 the 
cultural—and therefore also legal—significance of visuals has increased quite 
dramatically.24 This increased significance of visuals is reflected in the Estab-
lishment Clause context. The two graduation scenarios used in the introductory 
example illustrate a shift in Establishment Clause litigation over time: from a 
focus on words to images; from a focus on the textual to the visual.25 
In the Supreme Court, the first Establishment Clause cases were about 
money,26 then spoken prayers and devotional Bible readings.27 Over time, dis-
putes increasingly involved public displays of religious messages. Among 
these were textual displays, such as the Ten Commandments, and nontextual 
displays.28 The first two iconic Supreme Court cases involving nontextual reli-
gious imagery in Christmas displays, decided in the 1980s, were Lynch v. Don-
nelly and County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter.29 More 
recently, the Supreme Court confronted the display of a Latin cross directly in 
                                                                                                                           
 23 See Christina Spiesel, Reflections on Reading: Words and Pictures and Law, in LAW, MIND 
AND BRAIN 391, 391 (Michael Freeman & Oliver R. Goodenough eds., 2009) (“[Law] has thought of 
itself as pre-eminently about the use of words and their linear logics.”). 
 24 FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 7, at 10 (asserting that “our culture, and increasingly now 
the law as well—has gone visual”); Ira C. Lupu, Government Messages and Government Money: 
Santa Fe, Mitchell v. Helms, and the Arc of the Establishment Clause, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771, 
787 (2001) (discussing the “rapid transmission of pictures and symbols around the globe” and its 
“sweeping consequences for mass societies, far beyond its effect on law in general, or upon the small 
corner of Religion Clause law in particular”). 
 25 Cf. Lupu, supra note 24, at 788 (“In a fast-moving political culture in which visual images 
dominate public focus, public controversy over matters of government speech about religion can be 
expected to take precedence over issues of government money in support of religion.”). 
 26 See Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 292–93 (1899) (holding that congressional funding for 
a Roman Catholic hospital in Washington, D.C. was permissible). 
 27 See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 61 (1985) (holding that state law authorizing a one-
minute period of silence for prayer or meditation at the beginning of the school day violated the Estab-
lishment Clause); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963) (holding that a state 
action requiring Bible passages be read at the opening of the school day violated the Establishment 
Clause); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 422–24 (1962) (holding that public school prayer violated 
Establishment Clause). 
 28 McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 858 (2005) (holding unconstitutional a Ten 
Commandments display in a courthouse); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681 (2005) (plurality 
opinion) (holding constitutional a Ten Commandments display on the grounds of the Texas Capitol); 
Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40 (1980) (per curiam) (holding unconstitutional a Ten Command-
ments display in school classrooms); see also Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 464 
(2009) (holding that no First Amendment claim to forum access existed for a religious display in a 
park that contained Ten Commandments). 
 29 Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 579 (1989) (holding 
unconstitutional a Christmas display featuring crèche in a courthouse, while holding constitutional a 
Christmas display featuring a Christmas tree and menorah on public property); Lynch v. Donnelly, 
465 U.S. 668, 672 (1984) (holding constitutional a Christmas display featuring a crèche on public 
property). 
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a case involving a veterans’ memorial in the Mojave Desert.30 The Court has 
since denied certiorari in two other cases involving the Latin cross.31 
As the role of religious symbols became more controversial, such cases be-
came more salient.32 But the approach to visual symbols remains under-
theorized and subject to criticism.33 The Supreme Court most recently revisited 
the Establishment Clause in a textual speech case, upholding the practice of leg-
islative prayer at town board meetings.34 The resulting doctrinal parameters must 
take account of symbolic messages in future cases. Indeed, a challenge in the 
Elmbrook graduation-at-church case is already before the Court.35 Disputes over 
symbols will continue to arise, forcing courts to engage the power of visuals. 
A. Coercion and Endorsement as Distinct in Kind 
The key divide in theoretical and doctrinal approaches to the Establish-
ment Clause remains that between coercion and endorsement.36 The doctrinal 
fundamentals with respect to religious symbols are relatively simple, but in-
creasingly contested. The primary doctrinal basis remains the three-part test 
articulated by the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman.37 Justice Sandra Day 
                                                                                                                           
 30 Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 706 (2010); see also Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. 
v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 770 (1995) (holding that a First Amendment claim to forum access existed 
for a cross display). 
 31 See Mount Soledad Mem’l Ass’n v. Trunk (Trunk IV), 132 S. Ct. 2535, 2535 (2012) (denying 
certiorari on a case where the Ninth Circuit held that the Mount Soledad war memorial violated the 
Establishment Clause); Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12, 12 (2011) 
(denying certiorari where the Tenth Circuit held that memorial crosses next to highways were uncon-
stitutional). 
 32 Cf. 2 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIR-
NESS 74 (2008) (suggesting as the underlying reason that cases involving religious texts and symbols 
in public places did not reach the Supreme Court until 1980 “that various long-standing practices 
reflecting a Christian point of view have grown to seem more problematic than they had to earlier 
generations”). 
 33 See, e.g., Utah Highway, 132 S. Ct. at 22 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) (noting 
in the context of Establishment Clause cases involving religious symbols, that “it is difficult to imag-
ine an area of the law more in need of clarity”). 
 34 See Town of Greece v. Galloway, No. 12-696, slip op. at 1 (U.S. May 5, 2014). 
 35 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 1, Elmbrook II, 687 F.3d 840 (No. 12-755), 2012 WL 
6693652, at *1. One of the questions presented in the Elmbrook petition to the Supreme Court is: 
“[w]hether the government ‘coerces’ religious activity . . . where there is no pressure to engage in a 
religious practice or activity, but merely exposure to religious symbols.” Id. at *i. 
 36There are other tests and standards used in Establishment Clause adjudication. See 2 
GREENAWALT, supra note 32, at 157–93. This Article focuses on coercion and endorsement because 
they are the predominant approaches to communicative acts. The active/passive distinction is most 
salient for the two categories—coercive action and symbolic endorsement—created by these inquiries. 
For a discussion of the tests and standards used, see 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 32, at 157–93. 
 37 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971). The classic formula of this three-prong test states: “First, the 
statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that 
neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster an excessive government 
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O’Connor subsequently conceived the endorsement test as a clarification of the 
Lemon test in cases involving visual religious displays, such as a nativity scene 
and a Latin cross.38 But the coercion and endorsement approaches also consti-
tute larger, competing theories underlying the Establishment Clause. Thus far, 
Establishment Clause theory typically treats coercion and endorsement as dif-
ferent in kind.39 
The endorsement test inquires whether—from the perspective of a rea-
sonable observer—the State endorses (or condemns) a religious practice.40 Its 
normative basis is grounded in political theory: the harm against which the 
Establishment Clause is designed to protect is “send[ing] a message to non-
adherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, 
and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored 
members of the political community.”41 
The other major approach is the coercion inquiry. Justice Antonin Scalia 
in McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky and Justice Anthony Kennedy in 
County of Allegheny expressed a preference for applying a coercion theory in 
cases involving religious symbols.42 But the coercion inquiry has taken differ-
ent forms depending on the interpretive scope of coercion. Michael McConnell 
has described “religious coercion as the fundamental evil against which the 
[Establishment] [C]lause is directed.”43 The coercion inquiry will find a prac-
tice with “coercive impact”44 unconstitutional, and for some, only a coercive 
practice will violate the Establishment Clause.45 Christmas displays, for exam-
                                                                                                                           
entanglement with religion.” Id. at 612–13 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Though much maligned, the Court never explicitly overruled the Lemon test; it did, however, choose 
not employ the test in several cases involving religious displays. See, e.g., Utah Highway, 132 S. Ct. 
at 21 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of  cert.) (asserting that “five sitting Justices have questioned 
or decried the Lemon/endorsement test’s continued use”); McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 861 (declining 
to abandon the Lemon test); Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 686–87 (plurality opinion) (noting that the Lemon 
test is “not useful in dealing with the . . . passive monument”). 
 38 See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 772 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (discussing the endorsement test in a 
case concerning a Latin cross); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688–89 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (discussing the 
endorsement test in a case concerning a nativity scene). Although the endorsement test as originally 
proposed combines the first two prongs of the Lemon test, it has since arguably developed into a com-
peting theory. See 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 32, at 46. 
 39 See infra notes 40–59 and accompanying text. 
 40 See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 780–81 (O’Connor, J., concurring); Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 
620. 
 41Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 42 McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 908–09 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 
662 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 43 Michael McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
933, 939 (1986). 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 937 (“If Madison’s explanations to the First Congress are any guide, compulsion is not 
just an element, it is the essence of an establishment.”). 
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ple, though “manifestations of religion in public life,” are constitutional under 
this theory because they “entail no use of the taxing power and have no coer-
cive effect.”46 The coercion theory arguably is on the rise in the Supreme 
Court.47 The problem, of course, is to determine the meaning of “coercion.”48 
Contrasting Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion and Justice Scalia’s dis-
sent in Lee, the school prayer case used in the introductory example, illustrates 
the possible scope of coercion. Starting from the premise that the Establish-
ment Clause prohibits coercion into participation or support of “religion or its 
exercise,”49 Justice Kennedy’s interpretation of coercion encompasses “public 
pressure” and “peer pressure” on students attending a graduation ceremony to 
stand silently during prayer.50 By contrast, Justice Scalia’s dissent rejects the 
idea of “psychological coercion.”51 He suggests that the historical understand-
ing of the Establishment Clause prohibited “coercion of religious orthodoxy 
and of financial support by force of law and threat of penalty.”52 In addition, 
Justice Scalia deems impermissible state endorsement of divisive sectarian 
positions; nondenominational prayers, however, are permissible.53 Importantly, 
he points out that in Lee “no one [was] legally coerced to recite [prayers]” —
thus making compelled activity of the audience a key element of his under-
standing of coercion.54 For a majority of the Supreme Court Justices and 
scholars, however, a lack of coercion does not necessarily result in a finding of 
constitutionality.55 
                                                                                                                           
 46 Id. at 939. 
 47 See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Government-Sponsored Religious Displays: Transparent Rational-
izations and Expedient Post-Modernism, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1211, 1252 (2011) (“The Court’s 
new majority may be edging towards a holding that government is free to promote Christianity as long 
as it does so noncoercively.”); cf. Greece, No. 12-696, slip op. at 21–22 (relying primarily on the 
coercion theory). The decision in Town of Greece v. Galloway displayed a difference in the definition 
of coercion between the opinion for the Court authored by Justice Kennedy—joined in relevant Part 
II-B by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito—and the concurrence authored by Jus-
tice Clarence Thomas and joined, in relevant Part II, by Justice Scalia. Compare id. at 22 (noting that 
coercion does not arise when the prayers at question “neither chastised dissenters nor attempted 
lengthy disquisition on religious dogma”), with id. at 7 (Thomas, J., concurring) (defining coercion in 
the Establishment Clause context as “actual legal coercion . . . not the ‘subtle coercive pressures’ 
allegedly felt by respondents in this case”). This reflects Justice Kennedy’s and Justice Scalia’s di-
verging understandings of coercion. See infra notes 49–59 and accompanying text. 
 48 Cf. McConnell, supra note 43, at 941 (declining to offer a definition). 
 49 Lee, 505 U.S. at 587. 
 50 Id. at 593 (“This pressure, though subtle and indirect, can be as real as any overt compulsion.”). 
 51 Id. at 636–39 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 52 Id. at 640. 
 53 Id. at 641. 
 54 Id. at 641–42. 
 55 See id. at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“The Court has repeatedly recognized that a viola-
tion of the Establishment Clause is not predicated on coercion.”); 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 32, at 
157. 
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Coercion as envisioned by Justice Scalia is a different category of in-
fringement than endorsement. Justice Scalia’s version arguably makes the Es-
tablishment Clause redundant because the types of infringement he discuss-
es—compelled church attendance, disadvantages for dissenters, and the 
like56—are impermissible as a matter of free exercise.57 This is a categorically 
different harm than that caused by state endorsement of religion that does not 
violate an individual’s right to free exercise. As the contrast between Justice 
Kennedy’s and Justice Scalia’s interpretations of coercion in Lee shows, coer-
cion can indicate a wider or narrower category of state actions prohibited un-
der the Establishment Clause. Although Justice Kennedy expressed a prefer-
ence for an underlying theory of coercion,58 it is difficult to uphold a categori-
cal distinction between coercion and endorsement in light of his interpretation. 
Indeed, Justice Kennedy’s interpretation of coercion approximates endorse-
ment, whereas Justice Scalia maintains that there is “no warrant for expanding 
the concept of coercion beyond acts backed by threat of penalty.”59 These vari-
ations are only necessary if one follows the theory that Establishment Clause 
violations are only possible as a matter of coercion and that coercion and en-
dorsement are different in kind. But even if this line can be drawn with some 
clarity, the resulting categories do not pay sufficient respect to the subtle shifts 
in communicative impact that religious messages can have. 
B. Visual Communication and Passivity 
What do courts mean when they characterize a visual religious symbol as 
“passive”? Is “passive” always synonymous with “noncoercive”? Courts, as a 
doctrinal matter, typically use the endorsement test for evaluating religious 
symbolic displays.60 But a close reading of the relevant cases reveals that judg-
es are most likely to use the “passive” label in opinions upholding the displays 
in question, signaling in their reasoning that they are adopting a type of coer-
cion inquiry that may or may not be made explicit.61 This paradox—explicit 
use of the endorsement test and implicit assertion of noncoerciveness by apply-
ing the “passive” label—has significant traction in cases involving “passive 
symbols” and perhaps explains some of the confusion and unpredictability of 
outcomes in this area of the law. The distinction in kind between endorsement 
                                                                                                                           
 56 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 640–41 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 57 See id. at 621 (Souter, J., concurring) (arguing that this approach “would render the Establish-
ment Clause a virtual nullity”). 
 58 See id. at 587 (majority opinion); Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 661 (Kennedy, J., concurring 
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 59 Lee, 505 U.S. at 642 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 60 See, e.g., Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 620 (employing the endorsement test). 
 61 See infra notes 62–137 and accompanying text. 
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and coercion invites discarding visual images as passive, and the relevant case 
law indicates that courts are often amenable to this invitation. 
Following an underlying coercion theory, judges will likely make a dis-
tinction between active and passive, where passive denotes “noncoercive.” 
Following an endorsement theory, however, such a distinction would be largely 
irrelevant. Thus, to the extent that “passive” merely is synonymous with 
“noncoercive,” it signals that the judge’s underlying Establishment Clause the-
ory is in doctrinal opposition to the endorsement approach. But as one scholar 
notes, “[t]he psychological pressure to remain respectfully silent in the face of 
a symbol one finds objectionable” may in fact also have a “subtle coercive ef-
fect” on the observer.62 This also suggests that the label “passive” is unlikely to 
describe the audience in a constitutionally relevant manner, because the audi-
ence is always free to remain silent (passive), as seen in Lee.63 The basic idea 
of coercion is that individuals cannot be compelled to act; thus, it is unlikely 
that “passive” means passivity of the observer. It is more likely that it refers to 
the manner in which the symbol communicates its message. 
It is difficult to discern how much analytical weight courts actually place 
on the designation of visuals as “passive.” A skeptic might contend that the 
term has no independent, constitutionally relevant meaning. If “passive” in-
deed served no purpose beyond embellishment, courts ought to immediately 
abandon it. A related line of criticism might suggest that the term “passive” 
does not neatly align with “visual.” As will be shown, more often than not, it 
does. And in any event, the underlying problem—the disparate treatment of 
textual and visual communication where courts assume a hierarchy that privi-
leges the former—remains. 
The following discussion proceeds from the premise that “passive” has 
independent meaning. The sheer frequency of its use and its pervasiveness in 
cases involving religious symbols—not only domestically but also abroad64—
                                                                                                                           
 62 Mark L. Movsesian, Crosses and Culture: State-Sponsored Religious Displays in the US and 
Europe, 1 OXFORD J.L. & RELIGION 1, 5 (2012). 
 63 Lee, 505 U.S. at 593; cf. W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding 
unconstitutional a compulsory flag salute). 
 64 See Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, at *1, *29 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Grand Chamber Mar. 18, 
2011), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-104040, archived at 
http://perma.cc/Q4D3-ZMLZ. Though this Article focuses solely on domestic developments, it is 
worth noting that foreign courts have also used the language of “passive symbols,” most prominently 
perhaps the European Court of Human Rights in 2011, in Lautsi v. Italy, where the court allowed 
classroom crucifixes in Italian public schools. See id. at *31–32. 
 The Italian government argued that “[w]hatever the evocative power of an ‘image’ might be . . . it 
was a ‘passive symbol,’ whose impact on individuals was not comparable with the impact of ‘active 
conduct.’” Id. at *16. Referencing an earlier decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court, the 
applicants conversely argued “[a]s to the assertion that it was merely a ‘passive symbol,’ this ignored 
the fact that like all symbols—and more than all others—it gave material form to a cognitive, intuitive 
and emotional reality which went beyond the immediately perceptible.” Id. at *18. The Grand Cham-
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suggest that it does. Indeed, “passive” is used to discard the communicative 
power of visuals. This hierarchical understanding of words and images, this 
Article argues, is ill-conceived. 
The following Subsections explore how courts analyze visual religious 
iconography in comparison to textual religious messages in three contexts: re-
ligious imagery in public displays, the use of religious buildings for govern-
ment-sponsored secular purposes, and the use of religious imagery in expres-
sions of government identity.65 The discussion reveals that the “passive” des-
ignation can plausibly function in two ways—alternatively or cumulatively—
in order to justify disparate treatment of visuals and text. First, “passive” can 
denote an empirical claim regarding the manner in which visual images com-
municate. Passivity in this sense suggests less ability to communicate effec-
tively than textual speech. Second, “passive” can denote a bundle of factors, 
including brief exposure to the symbol, a vague notion of minimal offensive-
ness, or other characteristics of the symbol that result in its presumed noncoer-
civeness. But these notions, unlike the empirical claim, go to the context and 
cultural meaning of the symbol. The empirical claim is false;66 the cultural 
claim is complex and the “passive” designation is at best an ambiguous and 
misleading label.67 
1. Religious Imagery in Public Displays 
In Lynch—the progenitor case of visual symbolic religious displays—the 
Supreme Court upheld a holiday display on public property that featured a 
                                                                                                                           
ber explicitly addressed the active/passive distinction, stating that a crucifix on a wall is an “essential-
ly passive symbol and this point is of importance in the Court’s view, particularly having regard to the 
principle of neutrality. It cannot be deemed to have an influence on pupils comparable to that of di-
dactic speech or participation in religious activities.” Id. at *29. 
 Several concurring opinions also addressed the designation of the crucifix as a “passive” symbol. 
See id. at *34–37 (Rozakis, J., concurring); id. at *38–43 (Bonello, J., concurring); id. at *44–46 
(Power, J., concurring). The concurring opinion of Judge Ann Power agreed with the majority’s as-
sessment of the crucifix as a passive symbol “insofar as the symbol’s passivity is not in any way coer-
cive,” but her assessment was more nuanced. See id. at *45 (Power, J., concurring). She “concede[d] 
that, in principle, symbols (whether religious, cultural or otherwise) are carriers of meaning. They may 
be silent but they may, nevertheless, speak volumes without, however, doing so in a coercive or in an 
indoctrinating manner.” See id. As she framed it, the question thus is not whether symbols can com-
municate like textual language—she asserts they can—but whether the message communicated is one 
that violates the negative religious freedom of the observer under the Convention. See id.; see also 
Haupt, supra note 16, at 1024–32 (discussing Lautsi). 
 65 See infra notes 68–102 and accompanying text (religious imagery in public displays); infra 
notes 103–123 and accompanying text (religious buildings for government-sponsored secular purpos-
es); infra notes 124–137 and accompanying text (religious imagery in expressions of government 
identity). 
 66 See infra notes 151–187 and accompanying text. 
 67 See infra notes 239–299 and accompanying text. 
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crèche among various other (nonreligious) elements.68 Chief Justice Warren 
Burger stated “[t]he crèche, like a painting, is passive; admittedly it is a re-
minder of the origins of Christmas.”69 Further, he stated: 
To forbid the use of this one passive symbol—the crèche—at the very 
time people are taking note of the season with Christmas hymns and 
carols in public schools and other public places, and while Congress 
and Legislatures open sessions with prayers by paid chaplains, would 
be a stilted overreaction contrary to our history and to our holdings.70 
In short, if spoken and sung textual messages are allowed, a “passive” visual 
message ought to be permissible as well. But comparing the crèche to a paint-
ing suggests that its visual nature plays some role. Although it might refer to 
the aesthetic interest the town might have in displaying the crèche— similar to 
the interest in displaying a painting71—it would be rather nonobvious to de-
scribe this aesthetic interest as “passive.” 
In County of Allegheny, another Christmas display case, Justice Kennedy 
stated that “where the government’s act of recognition or accommodation is 
passive and symbolic . . . any intangible benefit to religion is unlikely to pre-
sent a realistic risk of establishment. Absent coercion, the risk of infringement 
on religious liberty by passive or symbolic accommodation is minimal.”72 In 
this context, “passive” describes the government’s posture towards the sym-
bols; it does not describe the way the symbols communicate or the effect they 
have on observers.73 But in the same case, Justice Kennedy uses “passive” to 
describe the display itself; this is more closely related to the visual character of 
the symbol.74 Further, Justice Kennedy noted that “[p]assersby who disagree 
with the message conveyed by these displays are free to ignore them, or even 
to turn their backs, just as they are free to do when they disagree with any oth-
er form of government speech.”75 In this instance, the passive nature seems to 
indicate that the display itself does not “speak” and that the observer can easily 
avert exposure to its message. 
                                                                                                                           
 68 645 U.S. at 685. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 686. 
 71 Cf. 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 32, at 76 (offering this interpretation but finding it likewise 
unconvincing). 
 72 492 U.S. at 662 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 73 See id. at 662–63 (“Noncoercive government action within the realm of flexible accommoda-
tion or passive acknowledgement of existing symbols does not violate the Establishment Clause un-
less it benefits religion in a way more direct and more substantial than practices that are accepted in 
our national heritage.”). 
 74 Id. at 664 (“The crèche and the menorah are purely passive symbols of religious holidays.”). 
 75 Id. 
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Thus, there are at least two (somewhat related) ways in which the “passive” 
designation operates: (1) to describe the relationship between the government 
and the symbol, indicating the manner in which the government recognizes reli-
gion (here, acknowledgment of religious practice); and (2) to describe the rela-
tionship between the symbol and its viewer (presumably, “not speaking”). The 
two are related to the extent that one assumes mere acknowledgment—rather 
than coercion or at least proselytizing—occurs when there is no textual message. 
In other words, visual messages, under this view, do not result in coercion. This 
designation, then, likely contains an empirical claim regarding the communica-
tive power of images. Moreover, it is also possible to conceive different levels of 
“activity” of the visual symbolic message. And while it may be possible to avoid 
the message of a holiday display,76 this is less easily accomplished in other set-
tings.77 This distinction hints at the different degrees of communicative impact 
that a symbolic message may have.78 
The “passive” designation also appeared in the Supreme Court’s Ten 
Commandments cases. In Stone v. Graham, the Court found insignificant “that 
the Bible verses involved in this case are merely posted on the wall, rather than 
read aloud.”79 Without overstating the significance of the distinction, it is in-
teresting to note that text “read aloud” and text “posted on the wall” —the lat-
ter a more visual display80—are contrasted. This reference might allude to a 
difference in quality that the Court detects between spoken and silent (that is, 
“merely posted”) texts.81 More importantly, then-Justice William Rehnquist 
referred in dissent to an earlier Decalogue case in which the Tenth Circuit 
characterized the monument as “passive,” which the court described as “in-
volving no compulsion.”82 
Almost twenty five years later, in Van Orden, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
picked up the “passive” characterization in upholding “[t]he placement of the 
Ten Commandments on the Texas State Capitol grounds,” which he described 
as “a far more passive use of those texts than was the case in Stone, where the 
                                                                                                                           
 76 See id. Though some would dispute that this is possible at all. See infra notes 185–186 and 
accompanying text. 
 77 See, Stone, 449 U.S. at 42 (holding unconstitutional a Kentucky statute requiring the posting of 
the Ten Commandments in public school rooms). 
 78 See infra notes 328–339 and accompanying text. 
 79 Stone, 449 U.S. at 42. 
 80 Cf. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 559 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(discussing printed text as graphic), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1996 (2013). 
 81 See Stone, 449 U.S. at 42. 
 82 See id. at 46 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“‘It does not seem reasonable to require removal of a 
passive monument, involving no compulsion, because its accepted precepts, as a foundation for law, 
reflect the religious nature of an ancient era.’” (quoting Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 475 F.2d 
29, 34 (10th Cir. 1973))). 
836 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:821 
text confronted elementary school students every day.”83 The use of “passive” 
in this context seems to take on a temporal dimension, in contrast to exposure 
“every day.”84 This, however, is a rather nonobvious meaning of the term.85 
Conceivably, the intent to influence the students in Stone is much more direct 
than is the intent to influence the (occasional or frequent) passerby in Van Or-
den; yet, the monument remained in place whether observers walked past it or 
not. This difference might make sense in distinguishing a permanent display 
from a temporary display. But it is not immediately apparent what role charac-
terizing the monument as “more passive” plays in distinguishing two perma-
nent displays featuring identical textual messages.86 The Chief Justice also dis-
tinguished the Ten Commandments monument in Van Orden from Bible read-
ing and prayer in schools;87 this aligns with an interpretation of text as active 
and visual images as passive. Moreover, he compared the monument to a wide 
variety of visual representations, all presumably as “passive” as the monu-
ment.88 Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III criticized the Chief Justice’s reliance on 
the characterization of the monuments as “passive,” stating that “Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s adoption of ‘passivity’ as the plurality’s test for upholding public 
religious messages is no model of clarity.”89 
In his dissent in McCreary County, Justice Scalia asserted that “[t]he pas-
sive display of the Ten Commandments, even standing alone, does not begin to 
[proselytize or advance any one faith or belief or apply some level of coer-
cion].”90 “Passive” here means “noncoercive.” He cited Justice Kennedy in 
County of Allegheny to illustrate the role of “passive” symbols.91 But Justice 
Kennedy’s analysis in County of Allegheny made the connection between “pas-
                                                                                                                           
 83 545 U.S. at 691 (plurality opinion). 
 84 See id. 
 85 Cf. Strasser, supra note 10, at 1157 (criticizing the temporal dimension). 
 86 See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 712 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In his Van Orden dissent, Justice John 
Paul Stevens likewise asserted that “[t]he monolith displayed on Texas Capitol grounds cannot be 
discounted as a passive acknowledgement of religion.” See id. Additionally, in addressing the Chief 
Justice’s comparison with Stone, Justice David Souter stated that “[p]lacing a monument on the 
ground is not more ‘passive’ than hanging a sheet of paper on a wall when both contain the same text 
to be read by anyone who looks at it.” Id. at 745 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 87 Id. at 691 (plurality opinion). 
 88 See id. at 688–89 (comparing the monument in Van Orden to varied depictions of the Ten 
Commandments at numerous locations throughout Washington, D.C., including at the Supreme 
Court). 
 89 J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Rehnquist Court at Twilight: The Lures and Perils of Split-the-
Difference Jurisprudence, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1969, 1989 (2006); see also Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme 
Court 2010 Term, Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Con-
stitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 68–69 (2011) (focusing on the passive designation in distin-
guishing outcomes in Van Orden and McCreary County). 
 90 McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 909 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 91 Id. at 909 (citing Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 664 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part)). 
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sive” and “noncoercive” less forcefully than did Justice Scalia. This, again, 
reflects Justice Kennedy’s wider understanding of coercion as seen in Lee.92 
In the lower courts, the qualitative distinction between textual and visual 
messages—frequently dismissing the latter as passive—has likewise taken 
root.93 Though some courts are suspicious of the “passive” designation, they 
find it empirically unclear how religious symbolic communication works and 
in which instances it constitutes a constitutional violation.94 The long-running 
litigation involving the Mt. Soledad Cross in San Diego provides an illustra-
tion.95 In its most recent iteration, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that the memorial’s current arrangement—which has a large Latin 
cross as its centerpiece—violated the Establishment Clause.96 But it was the 
district court’s usage of the “passive” designation that is particularly illuminat-
ing.97 After concluding that the Mt. Soledad Cross satisfied the Lemon test, the 
court conducted an inquiry into what it identified as one relevant factor: 
“whether [the monument] is passive or proselytizing in its effect.”98 The “pas-
sive” designation was used in various other ways throughout the decision, in-
cluding to describe the City of San Diego as an “absent and passive recipient” 
of the monument donated by a private group.99 Yet, it is irrelevant to the mes-
sage of the monument whether the municipality was “active” or “passive” in 
receiving the monument, except for the question of attribution of the mes-
sage.100 That determination does nothing to make the religious symbol itself 
                                                                                                                           
 92 See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text. 
 93 See, e.g., Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport, 637 F.3d 1095, 1110 (10th Cir. 2010) (Gorusch, J., 
dissenting) (dissenting from  denial of hearing en banc and characterizing the highway crosses at issue 
as “passive public displays”); Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1176 (D.R.I. 1981) (characteriz-
ing the nativity scene at issue as “passive”), aff'd, 691 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982), rev'd, 465 U.S. 668 
(1984). 
 94 See, e.g., Smith v. Lindstrom, 699 F. Supp. 549, 567 (W.D. Va. 1988) (acknowledging that 
“the effect of well-crafted symbolic speech is anything but passive, quiet, or ineffective”). 
 95 See Trunk v. City of San Diego (Trunk I), 568 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1203 (S.D. Ca. 2008), rev’d, 
Trunk v. City of San Diego (Trunk II), 629 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc denied, Trunk v. 
City of San Diego (Trunk III), 660 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied sub nom., Mount Soledad 
Mem’l Ass’n v. Trunk (Trunk IV), 132 S. Ct. 2535 (2012). 
 96 Trunk II, 629 F.3d at 1129. 
 97 See Trunk I, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 1218. The district court interpreted Ninth Circuit precedent—in 
particular the 2009 decision Card v. City of Everett—to extend the Van Orden holding beyond the Ten 
Commandments context to other passive displays. See id. at 1204, 1206 (citing Card v. City of Ever-
ett, 520 F.3d 1009, 1204 (9th Cir. 2008)). However, the district court’s reliance on Card is confound-
ing; there is no clear indication that the Card opinion purports to extend Van Orden beyond its imme-
diate context. See Card, 520 F.3d at 1018 (discussing the scope of Van Orden). 
 98 Trunk I, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 1218. 
 99 Id. at 1223. 
 100 See Claudia E. Haupt, Mixed Public-Private Speech and the Establishment Clause, 85 TUL. L. 
REV. 571, 601–06 (2011) (discussing attribution of speech in cases of donation of religious monu-
ments to municipalities). 
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passive. Turning finally to the assessment of “passive or proselytizing effect,” 
the district court distinguished the “passive” monuments in Van Orden from 
“other more confrontational displays which were meant to indoctrinate.”101 
The court noted that “[t]he gist of this observation is that passive monuments 
are less likely to violate the Establishment Clause.”102 The court’s former ob-
servation suggests a noncoercive effect; the latter is circular, simply equating 
“passive” with “likely to pass constitutional muster.” Thus, what becomes clear 
is that the “passive” designation used by courts obfuscates rather than clarifies 
the manner in which visual religious symbols communicate. 
2. Religious Buildings Used for Secular Purposes 
Sometimes, secular functions are brought to sites dominated by religious 
symbols.103 In several district court cases, school districts were barred from 
holding graduation ceremonies in churches.104 The issue of high school grad-
uations in church buildings has just now percolated through the federal courts. 
The Seventh Circuit decisions in Elmbrook, used in the introductory example, 
were the first time a federal appeals court addressed the issue.105 A three-judge 
panel initially upheld the district court’s decision holding that the practice was 
constitutional under the Establishment Clause, but the Seventh Circuit reversed 
after rehearing en banc.106 The initial panel decision suggested that if individu-
als proselytize (verbal) or distribute literature (textual), the outcome would 
                                                                                                                           
 101 Trunk I, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 1224. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Churches have been used as venues for a variety of secular purposes. Examples include the 
use of church property as public school classrooms, see, e.g., Porta v. Klagholz, 19 F. Supp. 2d 290, 
292–93 (D.N.J. 1998); Spacco v. Bridgewater Sch. Dept., 722 F. Supp. 834, 834 (D. Mass. 1989); 
Thomas v. Schmidt, 397 F. Supp. 203, 205 (D.R.I. 1975); State of Neb. ex rel. Sch. Dist. of Harting-
ton v. Neb. State Bd. of Educ., 195 N.W.2d 161, 162 (Neb. 1972); or other school events, see, e.g., 
ACLU-TN v. Sumner Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 03-11-0408, 2011 WL 1675008, at *1–2 (M.D. Tenn. 
May 3, 2011); the use of churches as polling places, see, e.g., Otero v. State Election Bd. of Okla., 975 
F.2d 738, 739 (10th Cir. 1992); Berman v. Bd. of Elections, 420 F.2d 684, 684 (2d Cir. 1969) (per 
curiam); and the use of a church as a post office, see Cooper v. U.S. Postal Serv., 577 F.3d 479, 484 
(2d Cir. 2009). 
 104 See Does v. Enfield Pub. Sch., 716 F. Supp. 2d 172, 175 (D. Conn. 2010) (finding a public 
school graduation at a Christian church to be impermissible); Lemke v. Black, 376 F. Supp. 87, 88 
(E.D. Wis. 1974) (finding a public school graduation at a Roman Catholic church to be impermissi-
ble). But see Musgrove v. Sch. Bd. of Brevard Cnty., 608 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1305–06 (M.D. Fla. 
2005) (finding a likelihood of success on the merits with respect to Establishment Clause challenge to 
graduation at a church “display[ing] a giant cross” but ultimately denying a preliminary injunction 
based on public interest considerations). 
 105 See Elmbrook II, 687 F.3d at 842; Elmbrook I, 658 F.3d at 712–13. 
 106 Elmbrook II, 687 F.3d at 843. 
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likely be different than if they were exposed to imagery.107 And, indeed, this 
was exactly what the en banc majority focused on.108 
The panel stated that “graduates are not forced—even subtly—to partici-
pate in any religious exercise ‘or other sign of religious devotion,’ or in any 
other way to subscribe to a particular religion or even to religion in general.”109 
It thus applied a theory of coercion to evaluate the religious imagery’s effect. 
Further, the panel stated that graduation attendees 
are not forced to take religious pamphlets, to sit through attempts at 
proselytization directed by the state or to affirm or appear to affirm 
their belief in any of the principles adhered to by the Church or its 
members. Instead, the encounter with religion here is purely passive 
and incidental to attendance at an entirely secular ceremony.110  
Characterizing the encounter as passive results from the absence of coer-
cion to participate in religious activity; “passive” denotes noncoercion. But in 
Lee, the graduation prayer case used in the introductory example, the Supreme 
Court found coercion where no active participation in the prayer was re-
quired.111 Thus, the only distinction plausibly left for the Seventh Circuit en 
banc review was the textual (prayer) in Lee as opposed to the visual (Latin 
cross) in Elmbrook. 
In reviewing the Elmbrook case en banc, the Seventh Circuit concluded 
that having the graduation ceremony in a church violated the Establishment 
Clause.112 Unlike the panel, the en banc majority applied a standard that did 
not focus solely on coerced activity, but rather combined coercion and en-
dorsement.113 In doing so, the majority focused on the textual elements—the 
religious literature and banners with religious messages—present in the 
church.114 Though the majority did discuss the cross “[l]iterally and figurative-
ly towering over the graduation proceedings,” it pointed out that “Elmbrook 
Church’s sizeable cross was not the only vehicle for conveying religious mes-
                                                                                                                           
 107 Elmbrook I, 658 F.3d at 733 & n.21. 
 108 Elmbrook II, 687 F.3d at 843–44. 
 109 Elmbrook I, 658 F.3d at 727. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Lee, 505 U.S. at 592–93. 
 112 Elmbrook II, 687 F.3d at 843. 
 113 Id. at 855 (“Although Lee and Santa Fe focus on the problem of coerced religious activity, it is 
a mistake to view the coercion at issue in those cases as divorced from the problem of government 
endorsement of religion in the classroom generally.”). 
 114 Id. at 850 (holding that a public school graduation ceremony in a church violated the Estab-
lishment Clause because the church “among other things featured staffed information booths laden 
with religious literature and banners with appeals for children to join ‘school ministries’” (emphasis 
added)). 
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sages to graduation attendees.”115 Returning to the textual, the court stressed 
the presence of religious pamphlets, literature, and banners in the church.116 
Pointing to “the sheer religiosity of the space,” the majority invoked both “the 
presence of religious iconography and literature.”117 But the court’s emphasis 
seemed to be heavily on the textual elements. 
While the majority did not use the active/passive distinction to describe 
either the display or the observers, Judge Ripple—in a dissent joined by then-
Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judge Posner—used it to describe both.118 Judge 
Ripple’s dissent discussed the majority’s application of Lee as well as the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe—
which held unconstitutional the practice of student-led prayer at football 
games.119 The dissent argued that the prayers in Lee and Santa Fe “amounted 
to state sponsorship of religious activity and coerced the attending students to 
participate, at least passively, in that religious prayer activity. There, the state 
had affirmatively sponsored, endorsed and coerced participation in a specific 
religious activity.”120 
The dissent distinguished the “religious activity” of prayer from “the 
mere presence of religious iconography and similar furnishings.”121 The ac-
tive/passive distinction in this instance is applied both to the prayer (“activity”) 
and symbols (“mere presence”) as well as the audience (“participate, at least 
passively”).122 This obscures which active/passive distinctions matter and how 
they matter. The dissent argued that “it certainly cannot be maintained that, 
like in Lee and in Santa Fe, they were coerced into participating, actively or 
passively, in any religious ceremony or activity.”123 But despite this finding of 
noncoercion, the role of the “passive” label here, too, is inconsistent at best. 
3. Religious Imagery in Official Expressions of Identity 
Religious text,124 religious symbols,125 or a combination of both126 are 
frequently used in expressions of federal, state, or municipal identity. For in-
                                                                                                                           
 115 Id. at 852. 
 116 Id. at 852–53. 
 117 Id. at 853. 
 118 Id. at 861 (Ripple, J., dissenting). 
 119 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 302 (2000); Elmbrook II, 687 F.3d at 863 
(Ripple, J., dissenting). 
 120 Elmbrook II, 687 F.3d at 862 (Ripple, J., dissenting). 
 121 Id. at 863. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. at 864. 
 124 See, e.g., Saladin v. City of Milledgeville, 812 F.2d 687, 689 (11th Cir. 1987) (word “Christi-
anity” in city seal). 
 125 See, e.g., King v. Richmond Cnty., Ga., 331 F.3d 1271, 1274 (11th Cir. 2003) (outline of stone 
tablets representing Ten Commandments in superior court clerk’s seal); Robinson v. City of Edmond, 
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stance, the national motto “In God We Trust,” the Court’s opening call includ-
ing the phrase “God save the United States and this Honorable Court,” and the 
reference to God in the Pledge of Allegiance are textual; so is the practice of 
legislative prayer. Yet none of these textual expressions have been considered 
to violate the Establishment Clause.127 While the religious content of the textu-
al expressions has not been called into question—and they are not “passive” —
they are thought not to violate the Establishment Clause mostly on the theory 
that these statements no longer have “force as an endorsement of belief in 
God.”128 The practice of legislative prayer is constitutional under the Estab-
lishment Clause on account of its historical permissibility since the first Con-
gress.129 Visual symbolic representations in expressions of identity might be 
thought of in a similar way—either lacking religious valence or embodying 
historical representations—though in some of these cases, too, the textu-
al/visual distinction suggests that courts tend to ascribe a stronger communica-
tive force to text. 
To illustrate, consider King v. Richmond County, Georgia, where the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held constitutional a superior court 
clerk’s use of a seal featuring an outline of the Ten Commandments.130 The 
image was “a depiction of a hilt and tip of a sword, the center of which is over-
laid by two rectangular tablets with rounded tops.”131 Rather than portraying 
the text of the Ten Commandments, “Roman numerals I through V are listed 
vertically on the left tablet; the right lists numerals VI to X.”132 The district 
court found no Establishment Clause violation, instead finding “that a depic-
tion without the text would not lead a reasonable observer to conclude that re-
                                                                                                                           
68 F.3d 1226, 1228 (10th Cir. 1995) (Latin cross in city seal); Murray v. City of Austin, Tex., 947 
F.2d 147, 149 (5th Cir. 1991) (cross in city seal); Harris v. City of Zion, 927 F.2d 1401, 1403–04 (7th 
Cir. 1991) (Latin cross as well as Latin cross, shield, sword, scepter, dove and crown, respectively, in 
city seals); Weinbaum v. Las Cruces Pub. Sch., 465 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1185 (D.N.M. 2006) (three 
crosses in seal on school district’s maintenance vehicles); Webb v. City of Republic, 55 F. Supp. 2d 
994, 995 (W.D. Mo. 1999) (fish symbol in city seal); ACLU of Ohio v. City of Stow, 29 F. Supp. 2d 
845, 847 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (cross in city seal). 
 126 See, e.g., Johnson v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bernalillo Cnty., 528 F. Supp. 919, 920 
(D.N.M. 1981) (cross and motto), rev’d sub nom. Friedman v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bernalillo 
Cnty., 781 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1985). 
 127 See generally B. Jessie Hill, Of Christmas Trees and Corpus Christi: Ceremonial Deism and 
Change in Meaning Over Time, 59 DUKE L.J. 705 (2010) (detailing the constitutional challenges to 
each). 
 128 See id. at 710. 
 129 Greece, No. 12-696, slip op. at 1 (upholding prayer in town board meetings); Marsh v. Cham-
bers, 463 U.S. 783, 790 (1983) (upholding prayer in state legislature); see also supra note 34 and 
accompanying text; infra notes 357–364 and accompanying text (discussing legislative prayer). 
 130 King, 331 F.3d at 1273. 
 131 Id. at 1274 (“Appellees conceded that the pictograph in the center of the Seal resembles depic-
tions of the Ten Commandments.”). 
 132 Id. 
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ligion was endorsed.”133 Although the court did not use the active/passive dis-
tinction, it did find the distinction between a textual and a nontextual represen-
tation relevant. The Eleventh Circuit likewise placed great weight on the ab-
sence of the text from the symbolic representation.134 In particular, the court 
concluded that “[b]ecause the words ‘Lord thy God’ and the purely religious 
mandates (commandments one through four) do not appear on the Seal, a rea-
sonable observer is less likely to focus on the religious aspects of the Ten 
Commandments.”135 This suggests that the text, rather than the visual symbolic 
representation, communicates the Decalogue’s religious message. 
Courts in similar cases dealing with religious iconography in municipal 
seals have referenced the passivity of symbols.136 One district court concluded 
that “it would be palatably unreasonable to require the removal of the passive 
and benign symbols of the cross and the motto [‘con esta vencemos’] from the 
seal.”137 While the absence of the text from the Ten Commandments illustra-
tion presumably can be understood as the absence of a religious message, it is 
more difficult to see the cross as devoid of religious content. Thus, “passive 
and benign” cannot indicate the absence of a religious message. It more likely 
means that the visual of the cross, like the visual of the Decalogue without 
text, is comparatively less capable of conveying a religious message than reli-
gious text. The communicative impact of visuals without the text, therefore, is 
deemed less powerful. 
* * * 
Courts tend to use the “passive” designation in Establishment Clause cas-
es involving visual religious symbols in two ways—either simultaneously or 
alternatively. To the extent the “passive” label functions as an empirical asser-
tion, it is based on an erroneous understanding of how visual images com-
municate. This misconception is perpetuated in Establishment Clause doctrine. 
It allows conceiving religious visual messages as constitutionally less trouble-
some and provides an avenue to discard them without fully engaging with the 
images’ communicative power. And when the passive label is used as short-
hand for a bundle of factors that go to the cultural interpretation and context of 
the symbol, the designation is misleading and therefore not particularly useful. 
                                                                                                                           
 133 Id. at 1275 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 134 Id. at 1285–86 (noting the absence of text material). 
 135 Id. at 1285. 
 136 See, e.g., Johnson, 528 F. Supp. at 925; see also Murray, 947 F.2d at 154–55 (discussing the 
noncoercive passivity of a cross in the city seal, which served primarily to identify city activity and 
property and to promote Austin’s “unique role and history”); Id. at 169 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) 
(“The cross is not a ‘passive’ symbol . . . .”). 
 137 Johnson, 528 F. Supp. at 925. 
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II. HOW IMAGES COMMUNICATE 
To rectify misconceptions and remedy the misguided approach to visual 
religious symbols illustrated in Part I, Establishment Clause theory must better 
account for the way in which visual images communicate.138 By failing to 
carefully consider the way in which visual images communicate, we are miss-
ing important empirical information that is relevant for assessing the commu-
nicative impact of symbolic messages. Section A of this Part will therefore in-
troduce empirical evidence to refute the text/image hierarchy based on visual 
perception.139 Cognitive neuroscience research shows that images are by no 
means less able to communicate messages than text. Indeed, visual representa-
tions in some instances may have a greater impact on the audience than spoken 
or written words. Visual representations of religious symbols can be just as 
active as—if not, in fact, sometimes more active than—written or spoken tex-
tual religious messages. They are, eponymously, “active symbols.” 
Courts, as demonstrated, make little effort to account for the visual nature 
of religious symbols or, worse yet, dismiss such symbols as merely “pas-
sive.”140 The focus on the textual has prevented the full appreciation of the vis-
ual nature of religious symbols as images. Giving short shrift to the visual 
happens in other contexts as well; copyright law is but one example.141 Tracing 
the courts’ aversion to images, one commentator even detected “in the history 
of the development of English law a conscious wall built against images, es-
                                                                                                                           
 138 This Article uses the term “image” to describe a two- or three-dimensional visual representa-
tion that exists as a physical thing in the real world (i.e., not merely cognitive, mental images that 
exist only in our heads). Cf. FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 7, at 5 (“In common usage, a ‘visual 
image’ can refer to an artifact, such as the snapshot you hold in your hand and look at; to your mental 
image of that photo; or to your visual memories drawn from your experience of looking at the photo 
or the thing that the photo depicts.”); Christina Spiesel, More Than a Thousand Words in Response to 
Rebecca Tushnet, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 40, 40 n.2 (2012), http://harvardlawreview.org/2012/02/
more-than-a-thousand-words-in-response-to-rebecca-tushnet/, archived at http://perma.cc/5UFV-
FAS8 (expressing preference for the term “picture” over “image”). Of course, these designations are 
arbitrary; others use different definitions. See, e.g., FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 7, at 5 (noting 
that “we will use ‘pictures’ to mean visually perceived artifacts, external visual representations, re-
serving ‘image’ for mental imagery (that is, internal, immaterial visual representations)”). Another 
scholar categorizes pictures as “all representations, including written or printed words.” Id. (referring 
to Richard Benson, former dean of the Yale School of Art). In the First Amendment context, Timothy 
Zick distinguishes between “oral symbols (words) and nonverbal symbolic gestures.” Zick, supra note 
12, at 2390. Frederick Schauer distinguishes linguistic and nonlinguistic communicative acts. Freder-
ick Schauer, Intentions, Conventions, and the First Amendment: The Case of Cross-Burning, 2003 
SUP. CT. REV. 197, 200. In the context of religious symbols, Kent Greenawalt distinguishes “signs 
with religious words” and “religious symbols.” 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 32, at 69. Likewise, my 
primary distinction is between textual and nontextual. 
 139 See infra notes 151–187 and accompanying text. 
 140 See supra notes 60–137 and accompanying text. 
 141 See Tushnet, supra note 7, at 688. 
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sentially shutting itself off from pictures.”142 Perhaps indicative of this lack of 
appreciation of the symbolic is Justice Robert Jackson’s observation that 
“[s]ymbolism is a primitive but effective way of communicating ideas.”143 By 
contrast, verbal expression is considered less primitive.144 In other words, texts 
enjoy privileged status in the law.145 One scholar observes that “[t]he prefer-
ence for text over image” in the First Amendment context “is often assumed 
and rarely explained.”146 The courts are not alone; “there is a strong cultural 
bias that thinking is accomplished only with words because language is the 
medium of thought.”147 Yet, in other First Amendment contexts, as Section B 
of this Part illustrates, “[v]isual images are frequently perceived as more pow-
erful and less controllable than verbal speech.”148 This characterization is 
clearly at odds with the notion of “passive” religious symbols. 
Moreover, as Section C of this Part argues in further detail, we must dis-
tinguish between visual perception of the message and the meaning of the 
symbolic content of the message irrespective of the medium.149 How images 
communicate is an objective empirical question. The answer can be provided 
by cognitive neuroscience. The way communication via images is processed is 
the same for all human brains. By contrast, the question of what images—and 
in particular, religious symbols—mean is context-dependent and subjective. 
The empirical data on visual perception thus is of only limited use in construct-
ing a more responsive conceptual framework.150 
                                                                                                                           
 142 Spiesel, supra note 23, at 403; see also Zick, supra note 12, at 2398 (asserting that judges 
display “a general disrespect for symbolism”). 
 143 W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943). 
 144 See Zick, supra note 12, at 2273. 
 145 See FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 7, at 4 (contending that law identifies rationality and 
virtue with texts rather than pictures); Spiesel, supra note 23, at 404 (discussing how law has depend-
ed on written texts for its development); Zick, supra note 12, at 2300 n.205 (arguing that the First 
Amendment protects verbal speech more than nonverbal gestures). 
 146 Amy Adler, The Thirty-Ninth Annual Edward G. Donley Memorial Lectures: The Art of Cen-
sorship, 103 W. VA. L. REV. 205, 210 (2000). 
 147 See Spiesel, supra note 23, at 392. 
 148 See Adler, supra note 146, at 217; infra notes 188–238 and accompanying text. Concerns 
about the power of images pervade other areas of the law as well. See, e.g., Carol Sanger, Seeing and 
Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to a Protected Choice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 351, 403–04 
(2008) (discussing the admissibility of fetal images in tort and criminal law); see also CHRISTOPHER 
B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE: PRACTICE UNDER THE RULES 186 (4th ed. 2012) 
(discussing the court’s “authority under Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and 611(a) to minimize the 
emotional impact” of photographic evidence); Neal Feigenson, Visual Evidence, 17 PSYCHONOMIC 
BULL. & REV. 149, 149–53 (2010) (providing an overview of studies of visual evidence on legal deci-
sion making). 
 149 See infra notes 239–299 and accompanying text. 
 150 See infra 300–364 and accompanying text (providing a new conceptual framework for Estab-
lishment Clause inquiries). 
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A. The Neuroscience of Visual Perception 
The human brain, as a generalizable matter, processes images and words 
each in a particular way. Empirical evidence of brain functioning comes from 
two different kinds of studies. First, on the input side, functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging (“fMRI”) can measure the difference in blood oxygen level de-
pendent (“BOLD”) signals at resting and stimulus conditions.151 Second, on the 
output side, responses to stimuli offered in several modes can be measured using 
a variety of ways that do not necessitate fMRI examination. For example, in tra-
ditional psychological research, the likelihood of remembering negative versus 
neutral textual information can be tested using questionnaires,152 and the pro-
cessing of picture-word stimuli can be examined in a similar manner.153 
At this point, three preliminary observations are in order. First, an im-
portant caveat: law and science differ considerably in their methodology and 
interpretation of materials.154 Legal scholars must therefore exercise particular 
caution when using neuroscience literature. Likewise, the translation of prima-
ry sources into the legal literature must be viewed with caution as the second-
ary literature (including the “neurolaw” literature) is likely to make more gen-
eralized statements than can be derived from experimental data as reported in 
scientific primary literature. This also explains in part why this Article uses 
neuroscience data to refute the empirical claim courts make with respect to 
visual perception of images, but not to fashion a new approach. Second, a 
word about what is not at issue in this discussion: the veracity of the visual 
representation. Much of the literature on neuroscience and the law concerns 
the descriptive value and “truth” of images, in particular photographs or vid-
eo.155 The descriptive aspect of images—whether the picture is an accurate 
representation of reality, as may be important in the law of evidence—is not 
                                                                                                                           
 151 RICHARD B. BUXTON, INTRODUCTION TO FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING: 
PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUES 7 (2d ed. 2009); Arno Villringer, Physiological Changes During Brain 
Activation, in FUNCTIONAL MRI 3, 3–7 (C.T.W. Moonen & Peter A. Bandettini eds., 2000). Some of 
the studies discussed below employ positron emission tomography (“PET”) rather than fMRI. See 
generally Marcus E. Raichle & Mark A. Mintun, Brain Work and Brain Imaging, 29 ANN. REV. NEU-
ROSCI. 449 (2006) (discussing the development of PET and fMRI BOLD imaging). 
 152 See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Kensinger & Suzanne Corkin, Memory Enhancement for Emotional 
Words: Are Emotional Words More Vividly Remembered Than Neutral Words?, 31 MEMORY & 
COGNITION 1169, 1171 (2003). 
 153 See, e.g., Yoav Arieh & Daniel Algom, Processing Picture-Word Stimuli: The Contingent 
Nature of Picture and of Word Superiority, 28 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY, & 
COGNITION 221, 222–23 (2002). 
 154 See Goodenough & Tucker, supra note 18, at 65–66 (providing an overview of concerns). 
 155 See FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 7, at 9–11 (discussing reality and depiction); see also 
Dan M. Kahan et al., “They Saw a Protest”: Cognitive Illiberalism and the Speech-Conduct Distinc-
tion, 64 STAN. L. REV. 851, 900–01 (2012) (using “cognitive illiberalism” to explain how people 
perceive “truth” to generate conclusions in line with their own values); Kahan et al., supra note 7, at 
903–04 (same). 
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the subject of this discussion. Indeed, the cases discussed here do not involve 
the veracity of photographs at all.156 Nonetheless, that body of literature is use-
ful beyond the question of veracity. Third, with respect to the difference be-
tween photographs and other visual images—such as religious symbolic repre-
sentations—it is significant to point out that many of the studies referenced in 
the following Subsections have employed a variety of visual stimuli, including 
photos and videos, but also drawings and other visual representations. 
Initially, “words and pictures as perceptions both represent just dataflow 
coming in from outside to be understood by the brain and processed for mean-
ing.”157 The difference results from what the brain does with the sensory inputs 
in different areas of the brain.158 Four aspects, discussed in turn, seem especially 
important in this context: speed of processing textual and visual information, 
connection to emotion, effect on memory, and persuasiveness. 
1. Speed 
First, the human brain processes visual images more quickly than 
words.159 In fact, the speed at which the brain can process images substantially 
exceeds the speed at which it processes words.160 There is an immediacy of 
reception connected with images that we do not have with words. 
Some studies combine words and pictures to test the speed at which our 
brains process images and words. In one study involving word-picture com-
pounds (e.g., the drawing of an apple with the word “lemon” written across it), 
                                                                                                                           
 156 Frequently the opinions themselves do contain photographs of the religious symbols at issue. 
See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 706 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 736 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting); Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 622 (1989); 
Trunk II, 629 F.3d 1099, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2011); Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport, 637 F.3d 1095, 
1125–27 (10th Cir. 2010). But veracity of the image is not questioned. See generally Hampton 
Dellinger, Words Are Enough: The Troublesome Use of Photographs, Maps, and Other Images in 
Supreme Court Opinions, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1704 (1997) (discussing the dangers of incorporating 
photographs and other images into Supreme Court opinions because the neutrality and accuracy of the 
images are routinely presumed). 
 157 Spiesel, supra note 23, at 393. 
 158 See id.; see also Elizabeth A. Kensinger & Daniel L. Schacter, Processing Emotional Pictures 
and Words: Effects of Valence and Arousal, 6 COGNITIVE, AFFECTIVE & BEHAV. NEUROSCI. 110, 123 
(2006) (finding that words are processed in the left amygdala and pictures bilaterally). 
 159 FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 7, at 9 (explaining that—due to the fact that sensory inputs 
are registered farthest from the frontal lobe where delayed response occurs—our brains process direct 
sensory inputs quicker than they process “language-mediated thoughts” involving reflection, critique, 
and suspicion); Christina M. Leclerc & Elizabeth A. Kensinger, Neural Processing of Emotional Pic-
tures and Words: A Comparison of Young and Older Adults, 36 DEVELOPMENTAL NEUROPSYCHOL. 
519, 520 (2011); Tushnet, supra note 7, at 691. 
 160 FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 7, at 7 (explaining that while both our eyes and brain can 
process visual information quicker than the conscious mind can notice, humans are able to “get the 
gist” of visual displays in less than a third of a second but take relatively longer to process the seman-
tic equivalent when received verbally). 
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it is interesting to note that participants named the word component faster than 
the image.161 But they categorized the pictures faster than the words.162 Anoth-
er study of word-picture compounds found that the evaluation of pictures was 
faster than that of words and the negative pictures were named faster than posi-
tive ones.163 
2. Emotion 
Second, images have a closer connection to emotion than words do.164 In-
deed, “pictures are especially well suited for conveying meaning through asso-
ciational logic, often infused with emotions that are triggered beneath our con-
scious awareness.”165 The appeal of images to emotion is not explicit.166 Ulti-
mately, one might argue, the source of “legal discomfort with images is the 
fear that they will make people feel rather than think.”167 
The proximity of perception and emotion, a result of the anatomy of the 
human brain, makes visual images particularly powerful.168 The valence-
dependent responses—meaning the perception of something as positive or 
                                                                                                                           
 161 Arieh & Algom, supra note 153, at 221–22. 
 162 Id. 
 163 Jan De Houwer & Dirk Hermans, Differences in the Affective Processing of Words and Pic-
tures, 8 COGNITION & EMOTION 1, 16 (1994). 
 164 Corbin, supra note 7 at 26 (stating that “images . . . often have an emotional impact in ways 
that words do not”); Leclerc & Kensinger, supra note 159, at 520–21 (“[P]ictures elicit activity within 
emotion processing regions at earlier time points than do words. Pictures also are believed to be more 
salient, and to activate emotional responses more easily than words.”); Tushnet, supra note 7, at 691 
(“[P]ictures can trigger emotions more reliably than words can.”). 
 165 FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 7, at 7–8 (“Words of course, can also prompt emotional 
associations, but pictures do this more rapidly.”); see also Annekathrin Schacht & Werner Sommer, 
Time Course and Task Dependence of Emotion Effects in Word Processing, 9 COGNITIVE, AFFECTIVE 
& BEHAV. NEUROSCI. 28, 40 (2009) (discussing emotional content of verbal stimuli). 
 166 Tushnet, supra note 7, at 696. 
 167 Id. at 695. This concern is also evident in recent discussions concerning emotion and judging. 
See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby, In Defense of Judicial Empathy, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1944, 1947 (2012). 
 168 FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 7, at 8; Spiesel, supra note 23, at 393. Feigenson and 
Spiesel further explain: 
The same areas of the brain that process visual perceptions are also responsible for 
mental imagery, and these are connected to the amygdala and other areas of the brain 
critical for emotion. And, because visual information acquires emotional valence before 
that information ever gets to the cortex, the whole picture passes along its emotional 
colors even as we begin to decode its parts. The initial emotional loading can occur 
nearly immediately and may influence further readings of the picture quite apart from 
any later contribution that cortical reflection makes. 
FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 7, at 393; see also K. Luan Phan et al., Functional Neuroanatomy 
of Emotion: A Meta-Analysis of Emotion Activation Studies in PET and fMRI, 16 NEUROIMAGE 331, 
331, 344 (2002) (reviewing 55 PET and fMRI studies investigating emotion). 
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negative—are more pronounced for pictures than for words.169 These results 
show that the brain responds more intensely to pictures than words. This 
statement is measurable by the intensity of the activation shift, made visible by 
means of fMRI. Importantly, this fMRI research confirms earlier findings of 
traditional psychological research that pictures have a closer connection to 
emotion than words and are processed faster than words for emotional infor-
mation.170 Because “religion is an emotional subject,”171 visual perception of 
religious symbols likewise is connected to emotion. 
3. Memory 
Third, related also to the previous point concerning emotion, is the observa-
tion that individuals remember emotional experiences more than non-emotional 
ones.172 In fact, memory is “[t]he cognitive domain where the influence of emo-
tion is best understood.”173 Traditional psychological research with respect to 
textual information confirms the commonsensical notion that “[i]ndividuals are 
more likely to remember negative information than neutral information.”174 This 
finding is confirmed by fMRI evidence.175 With respect to pictures, fMRI re-
                                                                                                                           
 169 Kensinger & Schacter, supra note 158, at 123 (finding a shift in localization of the response 
from the lateral prefrontal cortex to the medial prefrontal cortex); see also Leclerc & Kensinger, supra 
note 159, at 519, 533 (showing this to be true for different age groups of adults). See generally R.J. 
Davidson & W. Irwin, Functional MRI in the Study of Emotion, in FUNCTIONAL MRI, supra note 146, 
at 487 (discussing data from fMRI studies to assess human emotion). 
 170 De Houwer & Hermans, supra note 163, at 1 (finding support for their hypothesis “that pic-
tures have privileged access to a semantic network containing affective information”). 
 171 Elmbrook II, 697 F.3d 840, 873 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J., dissenting). 
 172 Turhan Canli et al., Event-Related Activation of the Human Amygdala Associates with Later 
Memory for Emotional Experience, 20 J. NEUROSCI. 1, 1 (2000) (discussing two PET studies and one 
fMRI study that “reported significant correlations between amygdala activation related to emotional 
stimuli and subsequent memory.”). Of the three studies mentioned, one PET study used film clips, see 
Larry Cahill et al., Amygdala Activity at Encoding Correlated With Long-Term, Free Recall of Emo-
tional Information, 93 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 8016, 8016 (1996); another PET study used 
pictures, see Stephan B. Hamann et al., Amygdala Activity Related to Enhanced Memory for Pleasant 
and Aversive Stimuli, 2 NATURE NEUROSCI 289, 289 (1999); and the fMRI study also used pictures, 
see Turhan Canli et al., fMRI Identifies a Network of Structures Correlated with Retention of Positive 
and Negative Emotional Memory, 27 PSYCHOBIOLOGY 441, 441 (1999). 
 173 R.J. Dolan, Emotion, Cognition, and Behavior, 298 SCI. 1191, 1192 (2002). 
 174 Kensinger & Corkin, supra note 152, at 1169; see also Elizabeth A. Kensinger & Suzanne 
Corkin, Effect of Negative Emotional Content on Working Memory and Long-Term Memory, 3 EMO-
TION 378, 378 (2003) (finding that negative information is better remembered than neutral infor-
mation). 
 175 Matthias H. Tabert et al., Differential Amygdala Activation During Emotional Decision and 
Recognition Memory Tasks Using Unpleasant Words: An fMRI Study, 39 NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 556, 
556 (2001). 
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search found that positive and negative images are more easily remembered than 
neutral ones.176 
Irrespective of emotional content, importantly, pictures are more likely to 
be remembered than words.177 This is known as the “picture superiority ef-
fect”178 for which the literature offers different theoretical accounts.179 In sum, 
if emotionally charged content is easier to remember than neutral content, and 
pictures are easier to remember than words, it logically follows that emotional-
ly charged pictures are particularly easy to remember. If it is true that religious 
content of religious visual symbols qualifies as emotionally charged, the in-
sight that emotionally charged visual information is easier to remember ap-
pears particularly salient. In particular, nonadherents or nonbelievers might 
have negative emotions associated with certain religious symbols.180 
4. Persuasiveness 
Finally, images “persuade without overt appeals to rhetoric”; this relates 
to the perception of text as rational and/or factual and images as irrational 
and/or nonfactual.181 One reason for the law’s bias in favor of text may be the 
association of the textual with “rationality” and “objectivity” and the associa-
tion of the visual with “irrationality” and “subjectivity.”182 The connection be-
tween text and rationality and images and irrationality accounts for a threat 
associated with the visual: “Images seem especially dangerous because their 
power is irrational.”183 The neuroscience evidence bears out the distinction 
between text as rational and images as irrational to some extent. Though the 
data of a text or a visual image is received in the same way, the image’s mes-
sage is processed differently in the brain than a textual message. As compared 
with words, “for pictures, the effect of emotion might be in evidence immedi-
                                                                                                                           
 176 Florin Dolcos et al., Dissociable Effects of Arousal and Valence on Prefrontal Activity Index-
ing Emotional Evaluation and Subsequent Memory: An Event-Related fMRI Study, 23 NEUROIMAGE 
64 (2004); see also Cahill et al., supra note 172, at 8016 (relying on a PET study to find this to be true 
for film clips). 
 177 Miriam Z. Mintzer & Joan Gay Snodgrass, The Picture Superiority Effect: Support for the 
Distinctiveness Model, 112 AM. J. PSYCHOL. 113, 113 (1999); Tushnet, supra note 7, at 691 (stating 
that pictures “are easier to remember than (roughly equivalent denotational) words”). 
 178 Mintzer & Snodgrass, supra note 172, at 113 (“The picture superiority effect is the highly 
consistent empirical finding that stimuli presented for study in picture form are more likely to be re-
called on a subsequent free recall test and to be discriminated from nonstudied stimuli on a subsequent 
recognition memory test than stimuli presented in word form.” (citations omitted)). 
 179 Id. at 113–17. 
 180 See infra note 253 and accompanying text (discussing how nonadherents or nonbelievers may 
perceive religious symbols differently). 
 181 Tushnet, supra note 7, at 692. 
 182 See id. at 693–94. 
 183 Adler, supra note 146, at 213 (“[B]y bypassing reason and appealing directly to the senses, 
images fail to participate in the marketplace of ideas.”); see Tushnet, supra note 7, at 694. 
850 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:821 
ately and might be evoked relatively automatically, whereas activation of emo-
tional responses for word stimuli may require more in depth and controlled 
processing.”184 Indeed, this is likely to disprove “the First Amendment truism 
that those who do not like a visual sign can avoid it ‘simply by averting their 
eyes.’”185 If the perception of a visual symbol occurs all at once,186 it cannot be 
retroactively averted. Yet, this was one of the arguments that Justice Kennedy 
made in the County of Allegheny crèche case.187 
B. Judging the Visual and Textual 
Despite this empirical data on visual perception, judges largely rely on in-
tuition when it comes to evaluating images.188 In the Elmbrook graduation-at-
church case, Judge Posner in dissent lamented the lack of constitutional or so-
cial science guidance for evaluating visuals.189 Judge Posner noted that the ab-
sence of either causes “judges [to] inevitably fall back on their priors, that is, 
on beliefs based on personality, upbringing, conviction, experience, emotions, 
and so forth that people bring to a question they can’t answer by the methods 
of logic and science or some other objective method.”190 Thus, as an initial 
step to allay these concerns, courts should take empirical neuroscience data 
into account. When approaching cases involving visual symbolic representa-
tions, courts cannot dismiss visuals; instead, they must fully engage with their 
power. 
Since “pictures, like words, can make meanings symbolically,”191 consid-
ering First Amendment speech cases proves instructive. In past speech cases, 
the Supreme Court has displayed a considerably more nuanced approach to 
visual symbolic communication than in cases involving visual religious sym-
bols.192 This suggests that concerns regarding the institutional competence of 
courts to properly account for the role of the visual are negligible once the pre-
vailing resistance to dealing with visual matters is overcome.193 Judges, a crit-
ic’s argument might go, are good at dealing with words, but not necessarily 
                                                                                                                           
 184 Leclerc & Kensinger, supra note 159, at 521. 
 185 Kenji Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument for Heightened Scrutiny for Gays, 96 
COLUM. L. REV. 1753, 1770 (1996) (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)). 
 186 Id. (“There is an ‘all-at-onceness’ to the perception of the symbol that gives it a stronger pres-
ence . . . .”). 
 187 See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 188 See infra notes 189–238 and accompanying text. 
 189 Elmbrook II, 687 F.3d at 873 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
 190 Id. 
 191 FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 7, at 7. 
 192 See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (plurality opinion) (cross burning); Texas v. 
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (flag burning); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (draft 
card burning). 
 193 See Zick, supra note 12, at 2340. 
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with images. But despite the interpretive difficulties attached to symbols, re-
covering the symbolic meaning of a message is not beyond the judiciary’s ca-
pabilities.194 For instance, citing the Supreme Court cross burning case, Virgin-
ia v. Black, “as an exception to the general doctrines of interpretive indiffer-
ence and avoidance,” Timothy Zick asserts that the case “holds out the possi-
bility that symbolic meaning can be recovered judicially” and calls the deci-
sion a “methodological success.”195 
The First Amendment speech cases provide sufficient evidence that judg-
es are in fact capable of assessing the communicative impact of images.196 In 
speech cases involving symbolic expression, such as draft card burning,197 flag 
burning198 or cross burning,199 the Supreme Court routinely had to consider the 
“communicative impact”200 of visual representations. In these cases, the Court 
decided that expressive conduct is sufficiently analogous to “actual speech” to 
warrant First Amendment protection.201 As this Article argues in Part III, fo-
cusing the inquiry on communicative impact better accounts for the underlying 
normative concerns of the Establishment Clause and, as a side effect, contrib-
utes to greater First Amendment symmetry as well.202 
In speech cases, the Court does not explicitly discuss the distinction be-
tween the textual and the visual beyond the observation that symbolic speech 
is speech for First Amendment purposes.203 But the Court’s discussion none-
theless appears relatively more attentive to the observations regarding the na-
ture of visual communication than in the Establishment Clause context. In 
Black, for example, Justice O’Connor observed that “[i]ndividuals burn crosses 
as opposed to other means of communication because cross burning carries a 
message in an effective and dramatic manner.”204 It is to a great extent the vis-
                                                                                                                           
 194 See id. 
 195 See id. at 2340, 2347 (citing Black, 538 U.S. at 343). 
 196 See, e.g., Black, 538 U.S. at 360; Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406; O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 382. 
 197 O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 367. 
 198 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 397. 
 199 Black, 538 U.S. at 347; R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 379 (1992). 
 200 See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 317–18 (1990) (communicative impact of 
flag burning); Johnson, 491 U.S. at 412 (same); O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 382 (noncommunicative impact 
of draft card burning). 
 201 See, e.g., Black, 538 U.S. at 358 (“The First Amendment affords protection to symbolic or 
expressive conduct as well as to actual speech.”); see also Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404 (“The First 
Amendment literally forbids the abridgement only of ‘speech,’ but we have long recognized that its 
protection does not end at the spoken or written word.”). But see Adler, supra note 30, at 210 (arguing 
that the First Amendment provides more protection for verbal speech rather than visual). 
 202 See infra notes 300–364 and accompanying text. 
 203 See Black, 538 U.S. at 360; Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406; O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 382. 
 204 Black, 538 U.S. at 360. 
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ual element of the “symbolic expression” that makes this form of communica-
tion so “effective and dramatic.”205 
Scholars, accordingly, have carefully examined the burning cross as a 
visual representation.206 The burning cross “communicates at a sensual, non- or 
pre-rational level, appealing to emotion and noncognitive understanding or 
interpretation.”207 This indicates that there is a difference between the visual 
and the textual; the former is “less susceptible to the cooling impact of cogni-
tive expression and reason.”208 In other words, although reading about a burn-
ing cross allows us to reflect rationally, witnessing a burning cross incites an 
automatic, irrational response.209 Likewise, it is the image of the burning flag 
that causes “serious offense.”210  And it is the effect of that image on the ob-
server that makes it different—contra Chief Justice Rehnquist—from someone 
“mak[ing] any verbal denunciation of the flag.”211 
Notably, neither the cross in the cross burning cases nor the flag in the 
flag burning cases were designated as “passive,” even though there is little that 
distinguishes those symbols from religious symbols deemed “passive.”212 In-
deed, “symbols of State often convey political ideas just as religious symbols 
come to convey theological ones.”213 And before they are symbols, they are 
visual images.214 In the flag cases, like in the cross burning cases just dis-
cussed, “the power of the symbol itself operates at a nonrational level.”215 
To be sure, there are profound differences between these cases involving 
flag burning and cross burning and those involving religious imagery.216 There 
are two layers of symbolism: the meaning of the symbol itself, and the symbol-
ic meaning of the act of burning the symbol. The cross was not just sitting 
there—it was burning. Aside from the obvious differences in substantive con-
tent, the message of destruction carries a specific connotation in the flag and 
                                                                                                                           
 205 Id. at 361. 
 206 See, e.g., RANDALL P. BEZANSON, ART AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 218 (2009). 
 207 See id. at 239; see also Black, 538 U.S. at 400 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“That cross burning 
subjects its targets, and, sometimes, an unintended audience, to extreme emotional distress, and is 
virtually never viewed merely as ‘unwanted communication,’ but rather, as a physical threat, is of no 
concern to the plurality.” (citations omitted)). 
 208 BEZANSON, supra note 206, at 252 (noting that “it is an entirely different experience to read 
about a burning cross than to witness it firsthand or see its image on film or canvas”). 
 209 See id.; Tushnet, supra note 7, at 691. 
 210 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 411. 
 211 Id. at 431 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 212 See, e.g., Black, 538 U.S. at 360; Johnson, 491 U.S. at 397. 
 213 See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 632. 
 214 See Adler, supra note 146, at 214 (“[T]he flag’s message is . . . conveyed solely through its 
visual image. It is a wordless pattern of stars, stripes, and colors.”). 
 215 Kent Greenawalt, O’er the Land of the Free: Flag Burning as Speech, 37 UCLA L. REV. 925, 
944 (1990); see Black, 538 U.S. at 360; Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406. 
 216 See Black, 538 U.S. at 360; Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406. 
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cross burning cases. But the manner in which visual perception operates is the 
same. And while visual representations in the Establishment Clause context 
have been deemed “passive,” the Court seems to be aware of their “activity” in 
the free speech context. 
Beyond the symbolic speech context, the most instructive examples of 
grappling with the textual and the visual are the opinions of Justices Samuel 
Alito and Stephen Breyer in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n—the 
case involving violent video games.217 Justice Alito closely examined the in-
teractivity associated with video games; he seemed troubled by the majority’s 
equation of the textual and the visual experience.218 Whereas Justice Scalia 
contended for the majority—citing Judge Posner—that “all literature is interac-
tive,”219 Justice Alito, joined in concurrence by Chief Justice John Roberts, 
suggested that “the experience of playing video games (and the effects on mi-
nors of playing violent video games) may be very different from anything that 
we have seen before.”220 The degree of interactivity Justice Alito attributed to 
video games does not correspond exactly to the breakdown of the textual and 
the visual; in his assessment, there is a quality of active engagement in playing 
video games that exceeds exposure to images in movies or on television.221 
But, however the lines may be drawn, the immediacy of video games depends 
in large part on the visual stimuli provided to the player.222 As compared to 
literature, thus, “video games are far more concretely interactive”; in addition 
to sound and touch elements, the visual element contributes significantly to the 
more vivid experience.223 
Justice Breyer focused on the harm that extremely violent video games 
can cause in children; in doing so, he used the active/passive distinction.224 
Video games, in Justice Breyer’s view, “can cause more harm . . . than can typ-
ically passive media, such as books or films or television programs.”225 As in 
                                                                                                                           
 217 See 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2742–51 (2011) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 2761–71 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 218 Id. at 2750–51 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (disagreeing with the majority’s assess-
ment that literature was as interactive as the violent video games at issue). 
 219 Id. at 2738 (“As Judge Posner has observed, all literature is interactive . . . . ‘Literature when it is 
successful draws the reader into the story, makes him identify with the characters, invites him to judge 
them and quarrel with them, to experience their joys and sufferings as the reader’s own.’” (quoting Am. 
Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 2001))); see also Tushnet, supra note 
7, at 745–47 (discussing Judge Posner’s assessment of the textual and visual in other cases). 
 220 Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2748 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 221 See id. at 2742. But see Tushnet, supra note 7, at 698 (suggesting that the lines may be drawn 
differently). 
 222 Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2748 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (discussing 
the high quality and realistic appearance of images). 
 223 Id. at 2750 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 224 Id. at 2768 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 225 Id. 
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Justice Alito’s concurrence, Justice Breyer’s alignment of active (video games) 
and passive (books, films, and television) does not correspond to the visual 
versus textual breakdown.226 Moreover, the “passive” label shifts between de-
scribing the medium itself and the viewer.227 Though less pronounced than in 
Justice Alito’s concurrence, the visual component in Justice Breyer’s dissent 
likely plays a significant role as well.228 Whether these opinions signal a new 
trend in Supreme Court opinions assessing visual experience on observers is 
unclear. But it seems worth noting that at least three justices seem aware of the 
potential importance of evaluating the power of visual images. 
In another context, two recent decisions concerning graphic warnings on 
cigarette packages illustrate how the distinction between the rational or factual 
associated with text and the irrational or nonfactual associated with images 
plays out. In one decision, the U.S Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held 
constitutional the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) graphic warn-
ing requirements.229 In doing so, the court considered the visual images to be 
subjective and acknowledged the “inherently persuasive character” of visual 
images.230 The dissent, moreover, elaborated on the emotional aspect of the 
images.231 In another decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
vacated the FDA’s graphic warning requirements on cigarette packages.232 In 
doing so, the D.C. Circuit addressed the distinction between textual warnings 
and visual graphic warnings.233 The panel majority and the dissent disagreed 
on whether the emotive nature of graphic images could render otherwise factu-
al accompanying text nonfactual or controversial.234 Notably, the dissent ar-
                                                                                                                           
 226 See id. at 2768. 
 227 Id. at 2769 (using the term in both ways—at times describing interactive games as more “pas-
sive” than other media types, but also describing the “passive” viewing experience of television and 
films). 
 228 See id. at 2767 (discussing “images of human beings as targets”); id. at 2771 (discussing de-
pictions and images). 
 229 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Disc. Tobacco 
City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 526 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 230 Disc. Tobacco City, 674 F.3d at 526 (“But, in contrast to the textual warnings, there can be no 
doubt that the FDA’s choice of visual images is subjective, and that graphic, full-color images, be-
cause of the inherently persuasive character of the visual medium, cannot be presumed neutral.”). 
 231 Id. at 528 (Clay, J., dissenting). 
 232 R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1208. 
 233 Id. at 1211. 
 234 Compare id. at 1216 (stating that the graphic warnings did not constitute information that was 
“purely factual and uncontroversial”), with id. at 1230 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (“That such images are 
not invariably comforting to look at does not necessarily make them inaccurate.”). In Discount Tobac-
co City, the Sixth Circuit said the images were factual. 674 F.3d at 569; see also Corbin, supra note 7, 
at 39 (agreeing with the Sixth Circuit’s determination that the emotion-invoking images were never-
theless factual and contrasting the reasoning with that of the D.C. Circuit in R.J. Reynolds). 
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gued that the emotive nature of visual images “does not necessarily undermine 
the warnings’ factual accuracy.”235 
In all of these examples, only Justice Breyer’s dissent in the video games 
case explicitly referenced neuroscience research.236 Otherwise, the distinctions 
between textual and visual appear to be largely a product of the judges’ intui-
tions. That does not mean that these intuitions are necessarily wrong in light of 
cognitive neuroscience insights; the speech cases discussed here illustrate that 
they may well be correct.237 But the absence of an empirical basis for these intui-
tive assumptions should give us pause. Indeed, as this Article argues with respect 
to religious symbols, such intuitive assumptions may just as well turn out to be 
wrong. And at least some judges seem acutely aware of this problem.238 
C. Distinguishing Visual Perception and Cultural Meaning 
So far, the discussion of religious visual symbols as images has largely 
disregarded the symbolic dimension. To reiterate, how visual images com-
municate is an empirical, objective question whereas the question of meaning 
is subjective and context-dependent. The neuroscience data presented in Sec-
tion A of this Part undermines the claim that visuals are somehow less power-
ful or even “passive” as compared to text.239 This Section shows that to the 
extent “passive” is shorthand for a bundle of factors related to context or cul-
tural meaning, the label is misleading at best, and therefore not useful.240 
For purposes of the Establishment Clause, we are only concerned with 
visual representations that are religious symbols. Thus, problems arise espe-
cially when visual representations are not obviously religious.241 Which visual 
symbols are religious? Semiotics teaches us that multiple steps are involved in 
getting from a visual image to a symbolic religious message.242 Simply put, 
cultural meaning is given to the symbolic representation. 
Images, like texts, must be interpreted to fully make their meaning acces-
sible. Images “acquire meaning from our associations to them, drawn from our 
perceptual knowledge, experience, [and] cultural setting.”243 This brings the 
                                                                                                                           
 235 R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1230. 
 236 See Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2768 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 237 See supra notes 192–235 and accompanying text. 
 238 See Elmbrook II, 687 F.3d at 873 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
 239 See supra notes 151–187 and accompanying text. 
 240 See infra notes 241–299 and accompanying text. 
 241 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 32, at 69 (“The interesting, and constitutionally troublesome, 
issues arise in more ambiguous situations, in which it is unclear either whether words or symbols are 
religious or whether the state supports the religious message that they indisputably convey.”). 
 242 See Zick, supra note 12, at 2330–32 (outlining semiotics in order to appropriately interpret 
enigmatic signs). 
 243 Spiesel, supra note 138, at 41. 
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communicative impact of visuals into conversation with more traditional ap-
proaches to the interpretation of texts and symbols, including literary criticism, 
ethnography, and other interpretive tools discussed in the legal literature.244 
Legal scholars have proposed various approaches to determine the symbolic 
meaning of a message.245 For example, several scholars have suggested look-
ing to the work of anthropologist Clifford Geertz.246 Using an ethnographic 
approach, these scholars argue, facilitates the recovery of the cultural meaning 
of the symbol.247 Cultural literacy in interpreting religious symbols thus be-
comes key; the observer must recognize the religious nature of the symbol or 
act. Indeed, as Justice Felix Frankfurter stated in his dissent in West Virginia 
Board of Education v. Barnette, “The significance of a symbol lies in what it 
represents.”248 
But who decides what the symbol represents? As Rebecca Tushnet ex-
plains, “we trust our own (natural-seeming and immediate) reactions to imag-
es, but we worry that other people’s reactions to images may be irrational—
especially if they don’t see the same things we do.”249 But what individual ob-
servers see is determined by their characteristics; what one may deem natural 
and immediate may not be at all obvious to someone else looking at the same 
visual representation. Whether the observer views a football game of his own 
team250 or is otherwise affiliated with one side,251 the same is likely true for the 
religious affiliation of the observer.252 If the observer is affiliated with a reli-
gious group whose symbol is on display, the perception is likely different than 
if the observer is not affiliated with that particular group or, even more prob-
                                                                                                                           
 244 See, e.g., Hill, supra note 10, at 493 (using a literary criticism approach); Zick, supra note 12, 
at 2265 (proposing an ethnography approach). 
 245 See, e.g., Hill, supra note 127, at 770 (applying a speech act theory approach to ceremonial 
deism); Hill, supra note 10, at 493 (applying a linguistic speech act theory to interpret the meaning of 
religious symbols). 
 246 See Ravitch, supra note 10, at 1021 (referencing Geertz’s analysis of the purpose of religious 
symbols in that they “function to synthesize people’s ethos”); Zick, supra note 12, at 2266 (stating 
that the Geertzian “approach . . . focuses on the interpretation of symbols and symbol systems within a 
culture”). See generally CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES (1973). 
 247 See, e.g., Ravitch, supra note 10, at 1021; Zick, supra note 12, at 2322. 
 248 319 U.S. at 662 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 249 Tushnet, supra note 7, at 721; see also Adler, supra note 30, at 214–15 (identifying similar 
issues in Barnette). 
 250 See Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 49 J. ABNORMAL & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 129, 132–34 (1954) (analyzing selective perception among fans at a Princeton-
Dartmouth football game). 
 251 This is a key theme discussed in the literature on cognitive illiberalism. See, e.g., Kahan et al., 
supra note 7, at 838. 
 252 See, e.g., 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 32, at 89 (“Most Christians may pass a crèche in a pub-
lic space without giving it a second thought; it may have more significance for most Jews.”). 
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lematically perhaps, not affiliated with any religion.253 Perception of the visual 
symbol, in short, arguably “depends on which team you favor.”254 
Moreover, in the context of religious symbols, in Lynch v. Donnelly, the 
Supreme Court suggested that to “[f]ocus exclusively on the religious compo-
nent of any activity would inevitably lead to its invalidation under the Estab-
lishment Clause.”255 Though questionable with respect to the conclusion on the 
merits, the idea is the same as the proposition that we tend to more easily find 
something we are looking for.256 This is not to say that the merits question will 
be answered differently, and uniformly, according to the religious background 
of the viewer.257 Instead, it simply means that perception is influenced by indi-
vidual characteristics. Moreover, this observation highlights the importance of 
distinguishing between perception, interpretation of the message, and the mer-
its question. It also illustrates one of the key problems of the endorsement 
test’s “reasonable observer” persona that (still) is predominantly used to assess 
whether public displays violate the Establishment Clause.258 
Justice Jackson in Barnette overstated the subjectivity of symbolic speech.259 
Sometimes symbols, including religious symbols, are relatively clear in their 
                                                                                                                           
 253 See generally Caroline Mala Corbin, Nonbelievers and Government Religious Speech, 97 
IOWA L. REV. 347 (2012) (contending that government religious speech violates the Establishment 
Clause even if it only offends nonbelievers); Nelson Tebbe, Nonbelievers, 97 VA. L. REV. 1111 
(2011) (arguing that courts should treat nonbelievers differently in Establishment Clause analysis). 
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more seriously—and the Geertzian approach appears to be one suitable avenue—it is not primarily the 
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 255 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984). 
 256 Though beyond the scope of this discussion, it is worth pointing out that there is a body of 
cognitive neuroscience literature dealing with the question of attention. For an example of such litera-
ture, see generally Kathleen M. O’Craven et al., fMRI Evidence for Objects as the Units of Attentional 
Selection, 401 NATURE 584 (1999). 
 257 See Hill, supra note 10, at 531–32 (arguing that religious background does not determine the 
outcome on the merits in religious symbol cases). 
 258 See 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 32, at 87 (“The test, at least in its basic outline, has consider-
able appeal, but its proper boundaries and status are elusive, and these bear importantly on how, in my 
judgment, courts should respond to texts and symbols that people may perceive differently.”); see also 
B. Jessie Hill, Anatomy of the Reasonable Observer, 79 BROOK. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), availa-
ble at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2330338, archived at http://perma.cc/EWB7-TGP3 (addressing criti-
cisms of the reasonable observer). 
 259 319 U.S. at 632–33 (“A person gets from a symbol the meaning he puts into it, and what is one 
man’s comfort and inspiration is another’s jest and scorn”). 
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meaning.260 This creates a conundrum that explains why visual perception 
alone cannot provide an answer to Establishment Clause inquiries. Two exam-
ples, the Latin cross and holiday displays, illustrate this problem. If images are 
as powerful as the neuroscience data suggests, they may still differ in their de-
grees of sectarianism. Arguably, the Latin cross conveys a more clearly reli-
gious message than the crèche as a component of Christmas displays. Thus, 
Part III provides a conceptual framework rather than an empirics-based one to 
reconceptualize Establishment Clause inquiries. 
1. Latin Cross 
One purportedly “passive” symbol in particular has been the subject of 
recent litigation, both domestically and abroad: the Latin cross. In determining 
the religious nature of a symbolic message, “the preeminent symbol of Christi-
anity”261 is the seemingly easy case. Federal courts have consistently interpret-
ed the Latin cross to be a religious symbol.262 Yet, even the Latin cross causes 
interpretive difficulties. Are we dealing with a bare cross, customary in many 
Protestant denominations, or a crucifix depicting the corpus, common in the 
Catholic, Lutheran, Eastern Orthodox, and Anglican traditions? The symbolic 
message communicated differs accordingly, and at least one judge has suggest-
ed a distinction in meaning on this basis.263 Despite general consensus that the 
cross is a religious symbol, there is a decided lack of agreement on the ques-
tion whether it has additional secular meaning.264 The “passive” label fails ad-
equately to capture these contextual concerns. 
                                                                                                                           
 260 See Laycock, supra note 47, at 1244–49 (rejecting the “assault on meaning” in cases involving 
textual and visual religious symbols); Zick, supra note 12, at 2336 (“Some symbols more or less 
speak for themselves; they are ‘uncontested’ in the legal sense of the term.”). 
 261 Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 725 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (referring to the cross). 
 262 See, e.g., Trunk II, 629 F.3d 1099, 1101 (9th Cir. 2011); Am. Atheists, Inc., 616 F.3d at 1160; 
Weinbaum v. Las Cruces, 541 F.3d 1017, 1022–23 (10th Cir. 2008); Separation of Church & State 
Comm. v. City of Eugene, 93 F.3d 617, 620 (9th Cir. 1996); Gonzales v. N. Twp. of Lake Cnty., Ind., 
4 F.3d 1412, 1418 (7th Cir. 1993); Ellis v. City of La Mesa, 990 F.2d 1518, 1525 (9th Cir. 1993); 
Harris v. City of Zion, 927 F.2d 1401, 1403 (7th Cir. 1991); ACLU of Ill. v. City of St. Charles, 794 
F.2d 265, 271 (7th Cir. 1986); ACLU of Ga. v. Rabun Cnty. Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 698 F.2d 
1098, 1103 (11th Cir. 1983); Gilfillan v. City of Philadelphia, 637 F.2d 924, 930 (3d Cir. 1980). 
 263 Separation of Church & State Comm., 93 F.3d at 626 n.12 (O’Scannlain, J., concurring) 
(“While a crucifix is an unmistakable symbol of Christianity, an unadorned Latin cross need not be.”). 
 264 See infra notes 265–287 and accompanying text. Courts elsewhere have encountered similar 
questions whether the Latin cross has a discernible secular meaning. In 2011, in Lautsi v. Italy, Italy 
argued that outfitting public school classrooms with crucifixes communicated a fundamentally cultur-
al, rather than religious, message. Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, at *1, *17 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Grand 
Chamber Mar. 18, 2011), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-
104040, archived at http://perma.cc/7B38-PCAX. 
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One nonreligious alternative meaning of the Latin cross is evident. The 
burning cross conveys a message of racial hatred;265 one that also attaches to 
the Ku Klux Klan’s (KKK) use of the cross when it is not set ablaze.266 In Cap-
itol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette—a case in which the KKK 
sought to place an unadorned (and not burning) cross in a display on public 
property—Justice Clarence Thomas pointed out the nonreligious meaning of 
erecting such a cross, characterizing it as “a political act, not a Christian 
one.”267 To be sure, the cross remains primarily a Christian symbol, but ac-
cording to Justice Thomas, “[t]he Klan simply . . . appropriated one of the most 
sacred of religious symbols as a symbol of hate.”268 The symbolic message 
communicated by the cross in this instance, therefore, is only apparent in light 
of the KKK’s authorship. 
In several more recent cases, another secular message has been ascribed 
to the cross. Several judicial decisions have found it to be a marker of the rest-
ing place of the dead, with various secular messages of honor, valor, and sacri-
fice attached.269 Justice Kennedy, writing for the plurality in Salazar v. Buono, 
interpreted the cross in this manner.270 Both Justice Kennedy and Justice Alito 
further interpreted the meaning of the cross as reminiscent of military cemeter-
ies in the United States and abroad.271 Likewise, in American Atheists, Inc. v. 
Davenport, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit—in a case involv-
ing Utah highway crosses—acknowledged that “a reasonable observer would 
recognize these memorial crosses as symbols of death.”272 But the Tenth Cir-
cuit also pointed out that there is a distinctly Christian dimension to the use of 
the cross as a marker of death.273 And though common as a symbol of death, it 
is not therefore secular.274 Likewise, in Buono, Justice Stevens expressed the 
view that “[m]aking a plain, unadorned Latin cross a war memorial does not 
                                                                                                                           
 265 Black, 538 U.S. at 357 (noting that the burning of a cross was a “symbol of hate”). 
 266 Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 770 (1995) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
 267 Id. (noting “the fact that the legal issue before us involves the Establishment Clause should not 
lead anyone to believe that a cross erected by the Ku Klux Klan is a purely religious symbol”). 
 268 Id. at 771. 
 269 See, e.g., Buono, 559 U.S. at 721 (plurality opinion); Davenport, 637 F.3d at 1111. 
 270 Buono, 559 U.S. at 721 (plurality opinion). 
 271 Id.; id. at 723–24 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 272 637 F.3d at 1122. 
 273 Id. As the Tenth Circuit put it, “a memorial cross is not a generic symbol of death; it is a 
Christian symbol of death that signifies or memorializes the death of a Christian.” Id. Further, the 
court found “no evidence . . . that the cross has been widely embraced as a marker for the burial sites 
of non-Christians or as a memorial for a non-Christian’s death.” Id. Similarly, an exchange during oral 
argument in Buono illustrated the difference between a generic marker and a distinctly Christian 
marker. Transcript of Oral Argument at 38–39, Buono, 559 U.S. 700 (No. 08-472). 
 274 Davenport, 637 F.3d at 1122–23. 
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make the cross secular. It makes the war memorial sectarian.”275 Therefore, 
even if there were a secular message grafted onto the religious message of the 
cross, it does not become “passive” in its meaning. 
Scholars and courts disagree whether meaning is an empirical question,276 
but that is a different question than the empirical claim regarding visual per-
ception. Does it matter for the assessment of the religious character of a cross 
memorial in Utah that the designers do not revere the cross as a religious sym-
bol277 and only eighteen percent of that state’s population does so?278 The larg-
er question is to what extent the local should matter in questions of Establish-
ment Clause application in general, and its application to religious symbolic 
expression in particular.279 But on the narrower question posed here, the con-
text of determining the symbol’s meaning, it is largely irrelevant whether the 
cross is revered as a symbol of faith in the local community.280 What matters is 
that it is recognizable as a religious symbol, even if it is not the object of reli-
gious reverence. Put another way, the majority of Utah citizens likely knows 
that the Latin cross is a religious symbol. Likewise, as cases such as Davenport 
show, the intent of the designers (and possible testimony as to intent) will not 
necessarily matter for the court’s interpretation of the symbol.281 Courts should 
attempt to inquire into the range of plausible meanings, including potential 
religious and secular meanings of the symbols, in coming to a context-
dependent conclusion.282 The difficulty of this analysis will vary case-by-case. 
If the Latin cross has additional meaning(s), should that matter for Estab-
lishment Clause purposes? Scholars have examined similar questions under the 
headings of contested and uncontested meanings,283 social meaning,284 as well 
                                                                                                                           
 275 Buono, 559 U.S. at 747 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 276 See, e.g., Hill, supra note 10, at 529 (asserting that lower courts treat meaning “as primarily an 
empirical question” and disagreeing with that approach). 
 277 Davenport, 637 F.3d at 1118 (“The secular nature of the UHPA motive is bolstered by the fact 
that the memorials were designed by two individuals who are members of the Mormon faith, the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Saints [sic] (‘LDS Church’), a religion that does not use the cross as a 
religious symbol.”). 
 278 Id. 1121–22 (noting that “a majority of Utahns do not revere the cross as a symbol of their 
faith”). The Tenth Circuit did not find that to be the case. See id. at 1122–24 (“Similarly, the fact that 
cross-revering Christians are a minority in Utah does not mean that it is implausible that the State’s 
actions would be interpreted by the reasonable observer as endorsing that religion.”). 
 279 See Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the Doctrine and Discourse of Religious 
Liberty, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1810, 1874–91 (2004). 
 280 See Laycock, supra note 47, at 1243 (reaching the same conclusion). 
 281 See Davenport, 637 F.3d at 1118; Hill, supra note 10, at 529 (discussing problems associated 
with treating “[t]he meaning of . . . allegedly religious symbols . . . as primarily an empirical ques-
tion”). But see Zick, supra note 12, at 2337–38 (noting that “the speakers testified with respect to their 
intended messages, thus removing any remaining symbolic uncertainty”). 
 282 Zick, supra note 12, at 2367. 
 283 Id. at 2336. 
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as consensus on meaning.285 As in the First Amendment speech context, there 
are standard and nonstandard interpretations of visual religious symbols.286 
The secular message of the cross in particular is far less obvious and far more 
contested than its religious message. As Douglas Laycock notes, the nonreli-
gious meaning of the cross, as discussed in these cases, depends entirely on its 
religious meaning.287 Thus, there is so little ambiguity in the message of the 
cross that, even if it communicates an alternative message—and especially if 
that alternative meaning is indeed entirely dependent on the religious mes-
sage—the alternative meaning should not matter for the message of the cross. 
And none of these alternative meanings, even if they were plausible, are help-
fully summarized under the label “passive.” 
2. Christmas Displays 
The ostensible problem of ambiguity we see in connection with the Latin 
cross does not arise in the same way in the Christmas display cases, because 
the crèche—with figures of Mary and Joseph, the baby, and the shepherds—
can be identified as the visual representation of the textual Biblical story of 
Jesus’s birth.288 This identification, of course, requires that the audience knows 
of the scriptural source. Perhaps more problematic, once the crèche is com-
bined in a Christmas display with other, secular features,289 selective observa-
tion may factor into the display’s assessment. We may focus on the religious or 
secular elements of such “mixed” holiday displays, depending on what we are 
looking for.290 Indeed a similar problem arises when the cross is only one ele-
ment of a larger display, such as the Mt. Soledad war memorial.291 
But there is another complication with respect to Christmas displays: the 
Christmas holiday, and the crèche as its representation, may have undergone a 
process of secularization.292 The Tenth Circuit, for instance, contrasted Christ-
                                                                                                                           
 284 CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CON-
STITUTION 124–28 (2007). 
 285 Hill, supra note 10, at 518. 
 286 See Schauer, supra note 138, at 226 (discussing nonstandard meaning of nonlinguistic com-
munication). 
 287 Laycock, supra note 47, at 1240–42. Laycock concludes that “[t]here is no ambiguity about 
the primary meaning of a Christian cross.” Id. at 1239. 
 288 See Luke 2:1–:20 (New American Bible); Matthew 2:1–:11 (New American Bible). 
 289 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671. 
 290 See supra notes 252–256 and accompanying text; cf. Tushnet, supra note 7, at 748 n.290 (col-
lecting sources that discuss how people will not notice things if they are not actively looking for 
them). 
 291 Trunk II, 629 F.3d at 1103. 
 292 See Hill, supra note 127, at 715–26 (discussing secularization thesis and criticisms); see also 
Ravitch, supra note 10, at 1059–61 (discussing the distinction between desacrilization and seculariza-
tion). 
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mas, “which has been widely embraced as a secular holiday,” with the cross, 
for which the court discerned “no evidence” of being “widely embraced by 
non-Christians as a secular symbol for death.”293 Although courts often assert 
that certain symbols or expressions have lost their religious content, it remains 
unclear how exactly they make this determination.294 Addressing this short-
coming, Jessie Hill suggests taking a linguistic speech act theory approach to 
the “methodological question whether the religiosity of a particular practice, 
symbol, or phrase has faded.”295 In the context of advocating a Geertzian ap-
proach, Timothy Zick argues that judicial interpretation has led to desacraliza-
tion of holiday displays in most instances.296 But even if an “authoritative 
means of resolving the meaning of sacred symbols” appears out of reach, a 
more attentive evaluation and interpretation is necessary.297 Some, however, 
point out that it is not the loss of religious meaning—the desacralization of the 
symbols themselves that is caused by adding secular elements—but rather the 
secularization of the overall display.298 It appears less important to determine 
who is right; it is, however, important to note that a shift in symbolic meaning 
seems to occur that changes the message communicated. Nevertheless, the 
core meaning of the symbolic representation is unambiguously religious.299 
Here, too, none of the shifts in meaning are usefully described as “passive.” 
 * * * 
Visual symbols are at least as “active” as textual speech, an empirical 
finding that is objectively ascertainable by neuroscience data. The data refutes 
the empirical claim that visual symbols are merely “passive” as compared to 
text. Judges seem to be aware of the activity of symbols in the speech cases 
discussed. The result of the empirical question—how images communicate, in 
light of the neuroscience data presented—is that text and visual images should 
be treated the same way in terms of their communicative impact. The separate 
question of symbolic meaning is context-dependent and subjective. At this 
point, the empirical literature can be brought into conversation with the inter-
pretive literature that concerns the meaning of symbols. The cultural interpre-
tation of symbols also is the same for visual and textual messages; text and 
images can equally be used to convey symbolic messages that must be inter-
                                                                                                                           
 293 Davenport, 637 F.3d at 1122. 
 294 Hill, supra note 127, at 714–26. 
 295 Id. at 731. 
 296 Zick, supra note 12, at 2367 (“The upshot, where some secular purpose, as is generally the 
case, can be ascertained or judicially imagined is that judges . . . will only in the rarest of circumstanc-
es perceive an unconstitutional establishment from the display of sacred symbols.”). 
 297 Id.  
 298 Ravitch, supra note 10, at 1059–61. 
 299 See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 284, at 134 (reaching the same conclusion). 
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preted in order to make their meaning accessible. Interpreting the meaning of 
symbols, thus, has nothing to do with whether the medium is textual or visual. 
III. COMMUNICATIVE IMPACT 
What prescriptive lessons follow from these insights for the Establish-
ment Clause and for First Amendment theory as it concerns visual symbols 
more broadly? Images speak at least as loudly as words, and sometimes—as 
the discussion in Part II suggests—a message may be conveyed even more in-
tensely by images than by words. There should not be a constitutionally rele-
vant distinction between images and words that discounts the communicative 
impact of images and privileges words. Having discarded the active/passive 
distinction and textual privilege, this Part provides a novel conceptual frame-
work for assessing symbolic religious messages according to their communica-
tive impact irrespective of the medium. It argues that endorsement and coer-
cion should be reconceptualized as matters of degree rather than kind, because 
doing so provides a better account of what matters: the communicative impact 
of a message. This conception is more responsive to the underlying normative 
concern that the State may not adopt a religious identity of its own. 
The most obvious immediate justification for the medium-neutral pre-
scriptive position stems from the text of the Establishment Clause itself. Textu-
ally, the Establishment Clause is medium-neutral; “Congress shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion”300 does not indicate by which 
communicative means an establishment results. To adapt the classic principle 
of media neutrality in copyright law, it is the establishment of religion that the 
Establishment Clause prohibits, and not the particular form by which such es-
tablishment is ultimately achieved.301 If textual messages are capable of pro-
ducing an Establishment Clause violation by communicating the state’s own 
religious identity and resulting preference for one particular religion, the same 
is true for visual messages. In light of the provision’s medium-neutrality, 
courts ought to assess textual and visual religious messages alike in terms of 
their communicative impact. 
This Part argues that courts should examine visual religious symbols un-
der a communicative impact framework. First, Section A explains that the pro-
posed communicative impact framework for visual symbols would result in 
greater First Amendment symmetry.302 Next, Section B addresses the question 
of when the communicative impact of religious symbols can be attributed to 
                                                                                                                           
 300 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 301 Cf. Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 98 (1899) (“It is the intellectual production of the author which 
the copyright protects, and not the particular form which such production ultimately takes . . . .”). 
 302 See infra notes 305–327 and accompanying text. 
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the State and accordingly trigger the Establishment Clause.303 Finally, Section 
C reframes familiar themes of Establishment Clause doctrine under the prem-
ise that the State may not communicate a religious identity, regardless of 
whether through endorsement or coercion.304 
A. First Amendment Symmetry 
Communicative impact is routinely examined in free speech doctrine and 
theory.305 There, the question is whether a law is aimed at the communicative 
impact of the expression or whether it is a law of general application that has an 
incidental effect on the communication.306 This question has relevance in the 
context of both textual and symbolic speech. For a symbolic speech example, 
recall only Virginia v. Black, the cross burning case.307 Communicative impact in 
the free speech area is employed to discuss the content of the message con-
veyed.308 Likewise, we are concerned with the question of content of the mes-
sage in the Establishment Clause context. In free speech scholarship, the content 
of the message conveyed is often expressed in terms of the speech’s communica-
tive impact.309 Importantly, scholars in the free speech context sometimes speak 
of communicative impact in terms suggesting a distinction of degrees.310 
                                                                                                                           
 303 See infra notes 328–339 and accompanying text. 
 304 See infra notes 340–364 and accompanying text. 
 305 See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (cross burning); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 
397 (1989) (flag burning); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (draft card burning). 
 306 See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376–77; LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
§ 12-2 (2d ed. 1988) (subsequently elaborating the O’Brien idea of communicative impact as govern-
ment motivation); John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and 
Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1496–98 (1975) (analyzing 
O’Brien’s communicative impact inquiry). 
 307 See 538 U.S. at 360–61; cf. Schauer, supra note 138, at 201 (explaining that “the case turned 
not on whether Virginia had targeted the communicative impact of cross-burning, for of course it had, 
but instead on whether this was one of the communicative impacts whose delivery the First Amend-
ment did not protect”). 
 308 Leslie Kendrick, Content Discrimination Revisited, 98 VA. L. REV. 231, 244 (2012) (explain-
ing that “content is most frequently glossed in terms such as ‘message,’ ‘substance,’ ‘meaning,’ or 
‘communicative significance’”). 
 309 Id. Sometimes “message” and “communicative impact” are used interchangeably. See Martin 
H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113, 117 (1981) 
(rejecting the O’Brien-Hart-Tribe concept but still agreeing with this point). 
 310 See, e.g., William E. Lee, The Futile Search for Alternative Media in Symbolic Speech Cases, 
8 CONST. COMMENT. 451, 457 (1991) (discussing alternative mediums for speech: “another medium 
will be adequate even though the communicator must sacrifice some intensity or communicative im-
pact”; “the alternatives must not result in diminished communicative impact”; and “the comparison of 
the communicative impact of various forms of speech”). Likewise, in the context of (usually textual 
expressions of) ceremonial deism, one scholar asserts that such messages, “though religious in origin 
. . . no longer carry any religious impact.” See Hill, supra note 127, at 712 (emphasis added). Further, 
she argues that city names “have lost their religious impact over time,” and concludes that “one might 
doubt whether the city names of Corpus Christi and San Francisco, or perhaps even the use of ‘A.D.’ 
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In its focus on communicative impact, the framework proposed in this Ar-
ticle results in greater First Amendment symmetry. Text should no longer be 
given special status in the Establishment Clause context; as previously demon-
strated, this distinction does not exist in the speech context.311 To be sure, the 
underlying concerns are different.312 We are not worried about preferential 
messages in the speech context; indeed, government speech can advance spe-
cific positions (e.g., anti-smoking or anti-obesity).313 There is, moreover, no 
inherent value in greater First Amendment symmetry for symmetry’s sake; the 
chief concern here is the empirical approach to visual perception. Why is the 
theoretical and doctrinal approach to a cross on the wall different than to a 
burning cross? On the level of visual perception, it should not be.314 
On the question of interpretation of the cultural meaning, historical and 
cultural context plays a crucial role. In Black, the burning cross was not merely 
an image, it was a symbol; what makes an image a symbol is the cultural 
meaning we attach to it.315 It was the visual character of the burning cross that 
was central to conveying a message that could hardly have been communicated 
in a textual form.316 The message’s specific “meaning—lynching, burning, vio-
lent racism—lay not in the image itself when viewed as a bare text.”317 Rather, 
it is the interpretation of its symbolism that gives it meaning. Thus, the “burn-
ing cross—a symbol—was understood to constitute essentially an explicit 
threat, allowing the state to ban cross-burning carried out for the purposes of 
intimidation.”318 
The cultural dimension of interpreting the symbol of the burning cross is 
well understood by the Supreme Court. Justice Thomas stated in his dissent in 
Black that “[i]n every culture, certain things acquire meaning well beyond what 
outsiders can comprehend. That goes for both the sacred, and the profane. I 
believe that cross burning is the paradigmatic example of the latter.”319 In the 
same case, Justice O’Connor stated in her partial majority and partial plurality 
                                                                                                                           
on public documents, should be unconstitutional given the apparent lack of religious impact those 
terms convey.” See id. at 726, 759 (emphasis added). 
 311 See supra notes 188–238 and accompanying text. 
 312 See Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 526 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(permitting preferential messages in the speech context). 
 313 See id. 
 314 See supra notes 151–187 and accompanying text. 
 315 See BEZANSON, supra note 206, at 239 (explaining that “historically grounded cultural mean-
ing attached to the burning cross” was due in large part to the experiences by people who witness the 
burning cross in public, especially for those people of race who “had deeply internalized the brutal 
connotations”). 
 316 See Tushnet, supra note 7, at 697. 
 317 BEZANSON, supra note 206, at 239. 
 318 See Tushnet, supra note 7, at 697. 
 319 538 U.S. at 388 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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opinion that a finding of intent to intimidate makes it essential to evaluate “all 
of the contextual factors that are necessary to decide whether a particular cross 
burning is intended to intimidate.”320 A key difference between Justice Thom-
as’s dissent and Justice O’Connor’s as well as Justice David Souter’s opinions 
lies in the role of standard and nonstandard meanings.321 Whereas Justice 
Thomas focused on the standard meaning of cross burning that communicates 
intimidation based on racial hatred, Justices O’Connor and Souter respectively 
emphasized nonstandard interpretations.322 This type of difference in interpre-
tive focus was equally evident in interpretations of the Latin cross.323 And, im-
portantly for the distinction between images and words, Frederick Schauer ar-
gues that the result in Justice O’Connor and Justice Souter’s opinions would 
likely have been different if the case had dealt not with a visual but rather a 
textual message.324 
In the flag burning cases, the Supreme Court, as one scholar put it, “seemed 
struck by the strange force of the flag as a visual symbol.”325 The range of mean-
ings possibly communicated by the flag thus played an important role, as the 
visual symbol’s various meanings could not be contained in a single message.326 
Interpretations of the Confederate flag offer a similar insight on varying interpre-
tations of the symbol. Courts have struggled to define the line between the flag 
being a symbol of hate and a symbol of historical significance.327 
We must distinguish how the observer sees, what the observer sees—a re-
ligious message or a secular message?—and how the observer interprets the 
possible effect of a religious message—endorsement?—that results from the 
display. Whenever there is communicative impact, two questions follow: first, 
whether the State is responsible for the message and, second, whether the im-
pact is coercive, endorsing, or otherwise has an effect that the Establishment 
Clause prohibits. 
                                                                                                                           
 320 Id. at 367 (plurality opinion); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 432 (1992) 
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (discussing the message sent by cross burning in context). 
 321 Schauer, supra note 138, at 223–24. 
 322 Id. 
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federate Veterans” license plates). 
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B. Calibrating Communicative Impact 
At a minimum, the Establishment Clause prohibits the State from adopting 
a religious identity as its own. Consequently, the Establishment Clause contains 
a content-based restriction on speech attributable to the government, prohibiting 
the State from communicating religious subject matter as an expression of its 
own religious identity or preference. In short, if the State may not have its own 
religious identity, it also may not communicate a religious identity.328 Whether 
such an expression of identity results in coercion or endorsement is discussed in 
the next Section. For the time being, it bears emphasis that Establishment Clause 
constraints only apply to religious speech attributable to the state. 
Considering the threshold question of attribution of the message to the 
State contextualizes the relationship between the message and its communica-
tive impact. I have argued elsewhere that, for attribution purposes, religious 
speech is best conceptualized as situated between the end points of purely pub-
lic and purely private speech on a mixed-speech continuum, as Figure 1 illus-
trates.329 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Responsibility for speech, I have argued, should be assigned by assessing 
“effective control” over the speech.330 The end-points designate pure private 
speech and pure government speech. At the private end of the spectrum, full 
free speech and free exercise protection applies; at the public end of the spec-
trum, Establishment Clause limits apply.331 Along the continuum, control over 
the message shifts; as long as private control outweighs government control, 
the message is attributable to private speakers, with full Free Speech and Free 
Exercise Clause protection.332 At the mid-point of truly hybrid speech, effec-
tive control is equally shared; here, I have argued, the underlying interests of 
the First Amendment require free speech protection of the message and simul-
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Figure 1: The Mixed-Speech Continuum 
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taneous imposition of Establishment Clause limits.333 Once the State has effec-
tive control over the message, Establishment Clause constraints apply.334 
Complementing this framework, we can conceptualize the mixed public-
private speech continuum as the x-axis with the communicative impact scale as 
the y-axis as illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
 
In terms of attribution, Quadrants I and IV represent instances in which 
the State has effective control over the message; accordingly, Establishment 
Clause limits apply. Quadrants II and III represent instances in which private 
speakers have effective control over the message; it is therefore fully protected 
by the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clause. Quadrants III and IV represent 
what we would term non-communicative in free speech terms.335 Here, the 
message has no (discernible) religious content. To be sure, what is nonreligious 
may sometimes be difficult to determine. But for purposes of assessing the 
communicative impact of religious messages, such messages lack significance. 
Finally, we do not need to evaluate the communicative impact of messages 
falling into Quadrants II and III because the communicative impact of religious 
messages attributable to private speakers is not a concern. Such speech is fully 
protected as a matter of free speech and free exercise. As soon as we are con-
cerned with religious messages attributable to the government, however, com-
municative impact matters. That is, once we have reached the point of at least 
truly hybrid speech on the mixed-speech continuum, we are concerned with 
the degree of communicative impact of the message. To be perfectly clear, this 
means that the following discussion will chiefly concern Quadrant I. 
                                                                                                                           
 333 Id. at 632–33 (explaining that in cases of truly hybrid speech, “the speech interests require a 
prohibition of viewpoint discrimination and simultaneous nonendorsement under the Establishment 
Clause”). 
 334 Id. at 589–90. 
 335 See TRIBE, supra note 306, § 12-2 (discussing communicative significance and communica-
tive/noncommunicative distinction); Ely, supra note 306, 1489–90 (same). 
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A medium-neutral inquiry focuses on the communicative impact of the 
message conveyed rather than a distinction between textual and visual—or 
corresponding designation as active and passive—as it relates to the means of 
communication. Admittedly, this results in a significant line-drawing problem; 
but the line drawing rests on the degree of intensity of the message communi-
cated, not the form of communication. Evaluating the message based on com-
municative impact corresponds to the normative question of at what point the 
State has assumed a distinct religious identity. 
Medium neutrality means that some visual symbolic messages may have 
similarly low communicative impact as textual messages such as “under God,” 
“In God We Trust,” or “God save the United States and this Honorable Court.” 
These statements do not violate the Establishment Clause.336 Similarly, visual 
messages may be deemed to have low communicative impact, as a result of 
their symbolic valence or strength of the religious message. Examples might 
include crosses in public buildings as an architectural feature, the frieze includ-
ing the Ten Commandments at the Supreme Court,337 or crosses in flags or 
coats of arms. Yet, the resulting permissibility under the Establishment Clause 
has little to do with their “passive” character but rather the low communicative 
impact of the religious message conveyed. 
Where does the cognitive neuroscience matter? Calibrating communica-
tive impact in light of the neuroscience data debunks the notion that visual re-
ligious symbols are somehow less powerful than text as an empirical matter, or 
“passive” due to their visual nature.338 But the focus on communicative impact 
in a medium-neutral manner is a conceptual tool rather than an empirical pro-
posal. In terms of relevancy for constitutional inquiry, there are limits on the 
lessons to be drawn from neuroscience. Neuroscience data does not provide a 
yardstick of constitutional wrong based on how individuals perceive visual 
representations of religious symbols. One might see some validation of the 
idea of a reasonable religious outsider as the reasonable person,339 assuming 
                                                                                                                           
 336 In dicta, current and former Supreme Court justices have indicated their approval for these and 
other forms of ceremonial deism. See, e.g., Town of Greece v. Galloway, No. 12-696, slip op. at 22 
(U.S. May 5, 2014) (Kagan, J., dissenting); McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 887–93 
(2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 26 (2004) 
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 35–36 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judg-
ment); Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 624–25 (1989) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 670–74 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 676–77 (1984); 
id. at 692–93 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also Hill, supra note 127, at 717–20 (discussing Su-
preme Court cases addressing instances of ceremonial deism). 
 337 See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 689–90 (2005) (plurality opinion). 
 338 See supra notes 151–187 and accompanying text. 
 339 See Caroline Mala Corbin, Ceremonial Deism and the Reasonable Religious Outsider, 57 
UCLA L. REV. 1545, 1598 (2010) (arguing that government speech should be considered through the 
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that such a person would have a negatively charged reaction to religious sym-
bols of groups other than their own. That negative reaction would have to rise 
to the level of feeling like an outsider in the political community, which is not 
measurable by gauging visual perception. But Establishment Clause theory and 
doctrine should take the broader lessons about visual perception into consider-
ation as judges conduct the inquiry into communicative impact. 
This does not preclude an empirics-driven solution at some future point. 
Several factors might be taken into account in determining the degree of com-
municative impact. A list might include spatial considerations such as size and 
location of the symbol, duration of exposure, religiosity, symbolic valence, and 
ambiguity. Unavoidable attention to a specific religious message also indicates 
a high degree of communicative impact; the message, of course, might be con-
veyed in textual or visual form. A bit lower on the communicative impact spec-
trum would be an avoidable religious message. And the lowest communicative 
impact results from a message that is not clearly religious, ambiguous, or 
commonly understood as nonreligious. To validate this list of factors, cognitive 
neuroscience research could potentially provide useful insights. If indeed a 
majority of individuals is affected in a certain way by these factors, they ought 
to be relevant in assessing the communicative impact of a message. We might 
be able to generate a presumption for different levels of communicative impact 
with respect to certain visual and textual symbolic messages in a variety of 
situations if we have an evidentiary basis; this evidentiary basis could conceiv-
ably be provided by future neuroscience research. 
C. Coercion and Endorsement as Matters of Degree 
On the merits, Establishment Clause jurisprudence is notoriously un-
clear.340 The Supreme Court’s most recent major Establishment Clause opinion 
held the practice of legislative prayer at town board meetings to be constitu-
tional.341 Applying the resulting framework to religious symbols is the next 
important step in clarifying current uncertainties in Establishment Clause doc-
trine. The first step in determining the proper merits test for religious symbols 
is to end misconceptions about how images, and in particular visual religious 
symbols, communicate. This is a matter of empirical evidence. So far, the 
courts have guessed—and in light of the cognitive neuroscience data, guessed 
                                                                                                                           
lens of a “religious outsider”); Hill, supra note 127, at 751; see also Capitol Square Review & Advi-
sory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 799 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“It is especially important to 
take account of the perspective of a reasonable observer who may not share the particular religious 
belief it expresses.”). 
 340 See, e.g., Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12, 22 (2011) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (urging the Court to “clean up our mess”). 
 341 See Greece, No. 12-696, slip op. at 1; supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
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wrongly—that visual representations of religious symbols are constitutionally 
less troublesome than textual ones. But this wrong guess should not be perpet-
uated in the doctrine. To the extent that coercion and endorsement matter, these 
approaches must equally engage the power of the visual and textual. 
This Section reframes familiar themes of Establishment Clause doctrine 
on the merits, proceeding from the normative premise that the State may not 
adopt its own religious identity and communicate it, regardless if it seeks to 
enforce it by means of coercion or promote it by means of endorsement. This 
theory conceptualizes endorsement and coercion as matters of degree rather 
than kind. Notably, however, abandoning the false notion of “passive” symbols 
is not predicated on adopting this theory. Within the framework of an underly-
ing theory of coercion or endorsement as alternative categories of state activity 
prohibited by the Establishment Clause, the implications of treating visual reli-
gious symbols as “active symbols” still apply. But reconceptualizing endorse-
ment and coercion helps address issues of varying degrees of communicative 
impact that might otherwise be insufficiently analyzed. This is particularly rel-
evant for communication at the margins that either falls between endorsement 
and coercion or under the rubric of mild endorsements. 
Reconceptualizing endorsement and coercion as matters of degree, there-
fore, serves as a more accurate way to think about the impact of religious mes-
sages, regardless of the medium. Although courts need not abandon the labels 
of coercion and endorsement, the advantage of this conceptual tool is to inte-
grate the two traditionally separate Establishment Clause inquiries into one. 
For both inquires, most important is the degree of communicative impact of 
the message. The existing labels correspond to different degrees of impact: 
coercion has high impact, endorsement has medium impact, and mild en-
dorsements have low impact. The existent categories thus are consistent with 
this proposal. But the concept of endorsement and coercion as matters of de-
gree provides a better account of the underlying concern: the communicative 
impact of the religious message conveyed, irrespective of its medium. Moreo-
ver, it does not invite the kind of sorting into active and passive that a distinc-
tion among endorsement and coercion as different in kind invites. A focus on 
the communicative impact of the message requires full attention to how a 
symbolic message communicates—whether visual or textual in nature. 
Reconceptualizing endorsement and coercion as matters of degree starts 
from the premise that the state may not adopt a religion as its own and com-
municate that preference. This can conceivably be done in various degrees on a 
spectrum. The spectrum would range from a weak form of state identity, which 
would be communicated via endorsement of religious preferences, to a strong 
form of state identity, which would be communicated and, indeed, enforced by 
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coercion.342 This approach renders the expansion of the coercion category un-
necessary; it takes into account that some forms of coercion are stronger than 
others. It also helps provide an account of how some forms of endorsement 
might be considered as troublesome as coercion. 
What does the communicative impact scale look like and how does it give 
guidance in deciding cases involving textual or visual religious symbols? In 
terms of degrees, the State might adopt its own religious preference and im-
plement it by legal coercion at the far end. In this strong form of religious state 
identity, the State has adopted a particular religion as its own and forces its 
citizens into compliance. If the State demands that people act a certain way, it 
has adopted an orthodoxy that it seeks to impose on everyone, and asks every-
one to actively subscribe to that orthodoxy and act accordingly. Coercion indi-
cates a necessarily high degree of communicative impact. It demands partici-
pation in or at least compels attendance of religious practice. Yet when Justice 
Kennedy, for instance, speaks of “subtle coercive pressure” in Lee v. Weis-
man,343 this suggests that degrees of communicative impact matter. 
But coercion is not necessary to achieve a high level of communicative 
impact. As Justice Scalia concedes in his dissent in Lee, messages of endorse-
ment may be as troublesome as legal coercion.344 A relatively high degree of 
communicative impact can also be reached via endorsement; this represents a 
weaker form of the same idea, where the State wants to convince everyone to 
follow state religion by means other than coercion, such as overt proselytizing. 
In County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, Justice Kennedy 
took this into consideration when he discussed the noncoercive, yet apparently 
equally troublesome, cross atop a city hall.345 In between, there are various 
conceivable degrees of endorsement indicating support for religious positions 
the State deems favorable.346 A parallel to free speech might consider persua-
sive effect,347 distinguishing the degree of persuasive/coercive force of the 
message. To pick up an example Douglas Laycock uses: “If a Christian cross 
                                                                                                                           
 342 Cf. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 604 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“Government 
pressure to participate in a religious activity is an obvious indication that the government is endorsing 
or promoting religion.”). 
 343 Id. at 588 (majority opinion) (holding that “subtle coercive pressures” exist in an overt reli-
gious exercise in a secondary school environment where a student has no real alternative which would 
have allowed her to avoid the appearance of participation). 
 344 Id. at 641 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the country’s constitutional tradition has “ruled 
out of order government-sponsored endorsement of religion”). 
 345 492 U.S. at 661 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (not-
ing that a cross atop a city hall would violate the Establishment Clause because the symbolic recogni-
tion would place government weight behind a specific religion). 
 346 See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 284, at 138; 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 32, at 186. 
 347 Kendrick, supra note 308, at 245–46 (discussing persuasion-related discrimination); David A. 
Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 334–35 (1991). 
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has sufficient secular meaning to fall outside the Establishment Clause, then so 
might a sectarian prayer.”348 The example illustrates the importance of as-
sessing communicative impact irrespective of the medium. 
At the low end of the communicative impact spectrum, this concept al-
lows for recognition that some messages, though religious in nature, are “un-
profound.”349 To illustrate, recall Van Orden v. Perry, where Chief Justice 
Rehnquist compared a freestanding Ten Commandments monument to the vis-
ual depiction of Moses as a lawgiver among other lawgivers in the Supreme 
Court chamber’s frieze.350 Although the same religious symbol is at issue, the 
degree of communicative impact is different. Thus, when Laycock discusses 
“enormous differences of degree” in various representations of the Ten Com-
mandments,351 the underlying concern is about communicative impact. But, as 
already emphasized, none of this depends on the form of communication; the 
communicative impact assessment applies to both visual and textual messages. 
Thus, there may be textual messages with less communicative impact 
than visual messages. The motto “In God We Trust” may have less impact on 
the audience than sitting through a graduation ceremony at a church richly out-
fitted with religious imagery. Similarly, a short prayer at a graduation or in a 
legislature is over within seconds, while a cross by the side of a highway can 
easily and immediately be registered as such—even with the observer travel-
ling at 55 mph352—and can trigger emotions accordingly. This results in signif-
icant communicative impact, and depending on the circumstances, the impact 
is perhaps as significant as a brief spoken prayer. 
To illustrate, consider three examples: first, the graduation-at-church case; 
second, the graduation prayer case; and third, the case of legislative prayer. 
Following this conceptual framework, the en banc decision in the Elmbrook 
graduation-at-church case probably came out the right way, though for the 
wrong reason.353 As discussed, the en banc majority in that case focused on the 
                                                                                                                           
 348 Laycock, supra note 47, at 1248. 
 349 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 32, at 91. 
 350 545 U.S. at 688 (plurality opinion) (noting the similarities between the two displays). 
 351 Laycock, supra note 47, at 1220; see also EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 284, at 142–43 
(contrasting the depiction of Moses in the Supreme Court frieze with other Ten Commandment mon-
uments). 
 352 See Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport, 637 F.3d 1095, 1112 (10th Cir. 2010) (“Because general-
ly drivers would be passing a memorial at 55-plus miles per hour, the UHPA determined that the cross 
memorials ‘needed to prominently communicate all of this instantaneously.’”); id. at 1121 (noting that 
although a motorist driving by at 55-plus miles per hour may not notice the biographical information 
on the memorial cross, the motorist would be “bound to notice the preeminent symbol of Christianity 
and the UHP insignia, linking the State to the religious sign”). 
 353 Elmbrook II, 687 F.3d 840, 856 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (holding that conducting a gradua-
tion ceremony in a church violates the Establishment Clause). 
874 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:821 
textual elements in the church.354 Giving the visual symbol of the cross short 
shrift is an indicator of the hierarchy of words over images implicit in many 
religious symbol cases. But paying close attention to the communicative im-
pact of the cross itself—the duration of exposure of the audience, the spatial 
setup with the cross as the centerpiece, the lack of ambiguity in the message 
conveyed by the cross given the spatial dimension—makes it a powerful vehi-
cle for a religious message. Indeed, it might be a more powerful vehicle than a 
short, nondenominational textual prayer as the one at issue in Lee.355 Thus, a 
focus on the symbol itself, rather than the textual surroundings that supple-
mented it, would likely have led to the same outcome, but with a rationale that 
pays heed to a medium-neutral evaluation of communicative impact of the 
message. 
This assessment does not necessarily place all other graduation-at-church 
scenarios in the same category of relatively high communicative impact. In 
Elmbrook, a high degree of communicative impact resulted from the presence 
of the cross and its surroundings, richly outfitted with other religious symbols. 
A lesser degree of communicative impact would be achieved in an unadorned 
church building; this, of course, relates back to interpreting the cultural mean-
ing.356 In terms of placing the message on the communicative impact spectrum, 
however, we are here only dealing with matters of degree when the religious 
nature of the message is clear. A low degree would be achieved if the gradua-
tion ceremony took place in a building owned by a religious group that did not 
function as a site of worship. 
The medium-neutral assessment guided by the communicative impact of 
the message likewise applies to textual religious messages. In the graduation 
prayer case, the length of the prayer and its denominational valence can in-
crease or decrease its communicative impact. In the school context, moreover, 
compelled attendance (whether direct or indirect) places school-related activi-
ties closer toward the coercion side. 
The final example, legislative prayer, illustrates how the mixed-speech con-
tinuum—the x-axis—relates to the communicative impact spectrum.357 Respon-
sibility for the speech may shift along the x-axis. If a member of the legislative 
body or a paid chaplain—as in Marsh v. Chambers—offers the prayer, such ac-
                                                                                                                           
 354 Id. at 852–53 (noting that the numerous pamphlets and other persuasive literature contributed 
to a finding that the selected location violated the Establishment Clause); see supra notes 112–117 and 
accompanying text. 
 355 See 505 U.S. at 578–79 (holding that a nonsectarian prayer at an official public school gradua-
tion ceremony imposes a high risk of compulsion and therefore violates the Establishment Clause). 
 356 See supra notes 239–299 and accompanying text. 
 357 To a lesser extent, a similar shift along the x-axis can occur in the context of graduation prayer 
if the prayer is offered by students. In the public school setting, however, the State generally retains a 
high degree of control over the message. See Haupt, supra note 100, at 592–93. 
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tions would be situated on the government speech end.358 Conceivably, however, 
the legislative body can open participation to other members of the communi-
ty—as the town board did in Town of Greece v. Galloway—inviting a rotating 
selection of speakers or (though highly unlikely to happen in practice359) even 
creating a public forum. Doing so would push the speech further toward the pri-
vate end of the continuum as effective control over the message shifts.360 On the 
communicative impact spectrum—the y-axis—the degree of impact can shift 
from coercion to lesser forms of noncoercive, yet high impact, to low impact. A 
clearly impermissible coercive practice might entail prayer by a member of the 
legislative body or a paid chaplain where attendance of the meeting is required 
(in such a case, moreover, the Free Exercise clause would certainly require an 
opt-out). A noncoercive practice of legislative prayer may also vary in its com-
municative impact. Notably, Marsh and Greece recognized that at some point, 
otherwise permissible legislative prayer could become impermissible.361 The 
idea of degrees of impact tracks closely with these concerns. 
To illustrate, consider the different degrees of impact if a legislative body 
adopts a policy, whereby at the beginning of the term all members vote in a 
secret ballot whether to: (a) open the session without any specified activity; (b) 
open the session with some purely civic activity (though the reference to God 
in the Pledge might already complicate matters); (c) hold a minute of silence; 
(d) say a nonsectarian prayer; or (e) pray in the name of Jesus.362 Assuming a 
truly secret and unanimous vote, there is no free exercise violation. Under a 
strict coercion theory, there would be no Establishment Clause violation if at-
tendees are given an opt-out.363 But seen on the communicative impact spec-
trum, other factors to be taken into consideration would include whether there 
                                                                                                                           
 358 See 463 U.S. 783, 792–95 (1983) (holding that the practice of opening legislative sessions 
with prayer by a chaplain paid by the state does not violate the Establishment Clause because it is 
simply an acknowledgement of widely held beliefs); Haupt, supra note 100, at 616–17. 
 359 See Christopher C. Lund, Legislative Prayer and the Secret Costs of Religious Endorsements, 
94 MINN. L. REV. 972, 1030 (2010) (arguing that although the public-forum concept can solve the 
problems associated with legislative prayer, the idea will not work because no government will likely 
be willing to give up control over legislative prayer). 
 360 Haupt, supra note 100, at 617–18. 
 361 See Greece, No. 12-696, slip op. at 14–15 (“If the course and practice over time shows that the 
invocations denigrate nonbelievers or religious minorities, threaten damnation, or preach conversion, 
many present may consider the prayer to fall short of the desire to elevate the purpose of the occasion 
and to unite lawmakers in their common effort.”); Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794 (noting that indications that 
a prayer opportunity was exploited to advance or disparage one particular faith may render legislative 
prayers impermissible). 
 362 Cf. Lund, supra note 359, at 1002 (discussing what makes legislative prayer more or less sec-
tarian). 
 363 See Greece, No. 12-696, slip op. at 22 (discussing the possibility of members of the public 
“leaving the meeting room during the prayer, arriving late, or even . . . making a later protest”); cf. 
Lee, 505 U.S. at 588 (noting that coercive pressures exist where an individual is left with no real alter-
native which would have allowed them to avoid the fact or appearance of participation). 
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is an audience364 or even whether the opening remarks are included in the leg-
islative record. 
These examples illustrate that conceptualizing coercion and endorsement 
as matters of degree along a communicative impact spectrum more accurately 
tracks changes in the message than does a single rule for legislative prayer, 
graduation prayer, or graduations held in houses of worship. Most importantly, 
in all instances the degree of impact is not contingent on the medium by which 
the message is conveyed. 
CONCLUSION 
Establishment Clause cases initially shifted from money to messages; 
within the latter, there is now a noticeable shift from textual to visual messag-
es.365 Contemporary Establishment Clause theory and doctrine still privileges 
the written or spoken word though an increasing number of high-profile cases 
now involve visual representations of religious imagery. In an era when visuals 
“increasingly dominate our culture,”366 scholars have detected a “changing 
legal culture” when it comes to the role of images in the law.367 Heightened 
sensibility with respect to visual representations would benefit Establishment 
Clause analysis of religious symbols as well. 
As Justice Breyer articulated, judges typically lack the social science 
training to evaluate empirical findings, such as neuroscience.368 Erroneously 
designating religious imagery as merely “passive” is a case in point. As this 
Article has demonstrated, religious symbols are not “passive;” visual religious 
symbols can be as active as—if not sometimes more active than—textual reli-
gious speech. Insights from neuroscience are gaining importance in a wide va-
riety of areas of the law; Establishment Clause theory and doctrine should 
likewise benefit from these insights. Arguably, “[t]he legal academy has yet 
seriously to come to grips with the changes that this infusion of the visual 
means for legal thinking and rhetoric.”369 Likewise, dealing with visual repre-
                                                                                                                           
 364 See Greece, No. 12-696, slip op. at 12–13 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 365 Lupu, supra note 24, at 773. 
 366 FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 7, at 2; see also Zick, supra note 12, at 2263 (“We live in a 
culture of symbols.”). 
 367 FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 7, at xi–xii (focusing on the role of digital pictures and 
multimedia in the courtroom). 
 368 Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2769 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 369 Spiesel, supra note 23, at 391; see also FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 7, at xi (“Under-
standing [pictures] requires new skills. That’s unsettling to many lawyers and judges; law school 
doesn’t train them to deal with pictures, and their experiences in practice may not have prepared them 
well, either.”); Sanger, supra note 148, at 361 (“[T]here has been no considered study of the role of 
visuality in law.”). The diverging results in cases involving the constitutionality of compelled visual 
speech underscore the legal uncertainty that currently accompanies visual images. See Corbin, supra 
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sentations in the area of religious symbols requires an appreciation for the na-
ture of images. If, for instance, Judge Posner is “invit[ing] a new jurisprudence 
of iconography,”370 a good starting point to assess Establishment Clause juris-
prudence as it relates to religious symbols is to look to other fields that teach 
us how images communicate. 
Judicial decisions dismissing the visual as merely passive are based on a 
misconception of how visual images communicate. The data provided in this 
discussion refutes the notion that visuals are passive and supports the notion 
that they are at least as active as words. For someone who intuitively agrees 
with the old adage that “a picture is worth a thousand words,” the neuroscience 
discussion may seem superfluous. But it matters because it provides data em-
pirically confirming the intuition. 
There is a larger trend in the law that has led to a re-examination of the 
role of images as distinct from words. Establishment Clause theory as it con-
cerns religious symbols must sufficiently account for the communicative im-
pact of visuals. Reconceptualizing endorsement and coercion as matters of de-
gree focuses attention on the communicative impact of the message. It discards 
misleading labels and categorizations, such as the notion of “passive” symbols, 
in favor of a comprehensive approach to religious symbolic messages irrespec-
tive of the medium by which they are communicated. After the Supreme Court 
has now revisited the textual by affirming the permissibility of legislative 
prayer, scholarship concerned with the future of the Establishment Clause must 
consider how the resulting doctrinal structure might apply to the role of reli-
gious symbols. A medium-neutral approach within a framework of communi-
cative impact provides an appropriate theoretical basis. 
 
                                                                                                                           
note 7, at 10 (“Mandatory cigarette graphics have been struck but mandatory abortion ultrasounds 
have been upheld.”). 
 370 Elmbrook II, 687 F.3d at 857 (Hamilton, J., concurring). 
  
 
